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To

My Dear Father.

PREFACE.

The following articles and monographs with the exception of that on the "Fundamentals of Indian Philosophy" are reprints, with slight modifications in some cases, from various journals. The essay on "The Doctrine of Māyā and the Results of Modern Science" appeared in *Sir Asutosh Silver Jubilee Commemoration Volumes.* vol. 1.; the monographs on "The Philosophy of Gauḍapāda" and "The Jaina Conception of Truth and Reality," the essay on "Mind in Emergent Evolution" form part of the *Proceedings of The Indian Philosophical Congress* of different years; "On the Concept of Progress" is a contribution to the symposium on Progress embodied in the *Proceedings of The Indian Philosophical Congress* (Madras). The articles on "The Ethical Basis of Philosophy" and on "Value and Personality" and the "Review of The Mysteries of the Soul" appeared in the *Calcutta Review*; aud that on "Lord Haldane & His Philosophy," in the *Asutosh College Magazine.* I must apologise for some obvious typographical errors which have crept into the book. But I hope the correct forms will readily suggest themselves.

I have to thank the editors of these journals for their kind permission to reprint the articles mentioned above.

Asutosh College, Calcutta.
April 1933.

H. M. BHATTACHARYYA.

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THE DOCTRINE OF MAYA AND THE RESULTS OF MODERN SCIENCE.

The Doctrine of Māyā, which, in its germinal stage, can be traced to the hymns of the Rigveda (R V. 1. 164. 46: *ekam sat viprā bahudhā vadanti*), and which was further outlined in the dialectic of Yajnavalkya and Maitreyi in the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad, systematised and perfected by the genius of Bādrayana and Sankara, and, though modified, yet kept in its integrity as regards its essentials in the later Upanishads, has admittedly, and not unjustifiably, occupied the supreme place in the systems of Hindu thought. And taking into consideration the still later literature which has grown round about this nucleus of thought one can fully appraise the high-intellectual vein of the mind of the Mayavādin at its proper worth. One who has taken pains to enter into its *logical* and *epistemological* problems, specially into the problems of *arthāpatti*, which consists in the *supposition* of the premises, reason or cause, from the conclusion, consequence or effect, and which therefore answers to the hypothetical method of modern European Logic and of *anupalabdhi* which has the exclusive privilege of cognising the *abhāva* or non-existence of a thing, the object of cognisance being not of course the absent thing, but the *absence itself* and which therefore affords a new dimension of perception, would, without the least hesitation, acknowledge the stupendous height of logical and epistemological speculation it has attained. And on its *ethical* side, suffice it to say that the world at large stands in awe and admiration before its sublime conception of morality which manifests itself in the quiescent, self-abnegating life of the *Jīvanmukta*.

A misconception however prevails, based no doubt on plau-

sible grounds, about its *metaphysics*, that it reduces the entire world of ours to *Māyā* or illusion—that the infinite variety of its contents living and non-living, that "the whole choir of heaven and furniture of earth" are swept into non-entity before the sole reality of *Brahman* which it upholds. In this way, it is further held, it offends against common sense and ordinary experience, which are loath to disbelieve in the stern reality of the world round about us, as it brushes it away, instead of explaining it, and finally it contradicts the results of modern scientific researches which are based on the irresistible theory of Natural Realism. It is therefore the absolutist Vedantic metaphysics, in particular, that has furnished the object of criticism, not only for some of the other schools of classical Hindu Philosophy, nor again for some of the ramifications of the Vedantic School itself, viz the system of Ramanuja and others but also, curiously enough, for many of those modern dabblers in philosophy who have little or no pretension to independent lucubrations, but only allow themselves to be sophisticated by the cheap rationalism of the Hegelian type, and show a readiness to shrug their shoulders in contempt whenever they find any very great height or depth in Eastern speculation and to pronounce it immediately as hypersubtile or mystical.

Now the primary end of the present article is to counteract and dispel this baseless misconception of Vedantic Realism on the part of these last mentioned modern philosophy-mongers by showing that contradiction to European common sense, and scientific thought, if there be any, is rather apparent than real; and that the Vedantic-metaphysical standpoint, if rightly understood, will not be found to suffer from bad logic any more than the "scientific" thought of the present day. All this has been attempted in this essay not with the polemic of a dogmatic apologist but with the perfect open-minded impartiality of a truth-seeking free-thinker. The

aim of this article thus being circumscribed to an examination of the allegation against Vedantic Metaphysics in the light of modern scientific thought, be it said at the outset, that it does not of course claim completeness as an elaborate treatment of the Vedantic theory as a whole which is more than what our space permits.

Now what is to be understood by this principle of *Māyā?* We cognise something and *ipso facto* cannot take it as unreal, we give ourselves to the belief in its reality. Then we bring our powers of reflection to bear upon this naive belief and find that after all we cannot reconcile ourselves to it. Thus what was regarded as real from one standpoint melts into unreality from another. And all this is due to what the Vedantist understands by his principle of *Māyā*.

The juggler produces in the twinkling of an eye a fullgrown mango-tree out of a mango-seed before an astounded audience. They cannot deny the apparent reality of the full grown mango-tree which they see with their own eyes, nor again can they affirm it when they reflect on the inconceivably short time within which it is made to grow into foliage, flowers and fruit. They would assign it to Māyā or illusion.

The principle of Māyā is then what makes a thing to appear as real from one stand-point, but reduces it to be unreal from another, what, in other words, gives an air of reality to what is really unreal, makes one and the same object to be both *sat*, real, as well as *asat*, unreal. Māyā is thus otherwise described as *sadasadbhyām anirvāchyā*—an inexplicable enigma of Being and Non-Being. of the Real and the Unreal.

This enigma of the apparent reality of a thing is created by the double function of the principle of Māyā. In the first instance it operates in the form of *āvaraṇa ṣakti* or the function of what may be somehow expressed by the term "subjection" which "throws under" or covers or conceals the actu-

al nature of the thing; and then it works in the shape of *vikh-sepa gakti* or the function of what may be called "projection" which projects, or creates, or imposes on the already conceal-ed thing the new sensory elements of what is unreal, the cu-mulative effect of this double function of Māyā being the il-lusory perception of a thing, the nacre for example being mis-taken for silver. The *modus operandi* of the principle of Māyā, therefore, is that first of all it covers the real and then discovers the unreal, the result of all this being that it shuts one out from the knowledge of a thing. Hence Māyā is *Avi-dyā* or *Nescience.*

The Nature of Māyā becomes further illumined from a consideration of the Vedāntic theory of Causality. Vedānta affirms that the cause is not absolutely homogeneous with, nor again absolutely heterogeneous to the effect. For, had the cause been absolutely heterogeneous to the effect, then the effect would have no connection with the cause, any effect whatsoever could have been produced out of any cause what-soever—to quote the classical example, oil could have been produced, not only out of oil-seeds, but also out of grains of sand. And again were it possible to suppose that the effect is absolutely homogeneous or identical with the cause, then the usual and practical distinctions between one thing and another would become altogether meaningless; the lump of clay could have been used in place of an earthen pot, an earthen jar would have served the purpose of an earthen bowl, which however can never be the case. The effect is thus neither totally homogeneous with, nor again absolutely heterogeneous to the cause. It is thus the same as, yet different from the cause. The earthen jar is the clay and yet is not the clay, the jar *qua* jar is *sat* or real and yet the jar as clay is *asat* or un-real. Are we not then tempted to say that the phenomena of cause and effect are products of illusion whose nature it is to make one believe in that which is not really itself? The

illusion under which one finds oneself in the understanding of cause and effect differs from that in the case where nacre is mistaken for silver, only in degree and not in kind. The illu-sion in our mistake of nacre for silver is comparatively short-lived, whereas that in our attempt to understand the world of our experience, which is bound by a network of causes and effects, persists until the attainment of the monistic know-ledge (*advaitagnāna*), which is *Brahman.*

The above consideration of the Vedāntic doctrine of causa-lity reveals to us the further fact that Māyā is the root of all *difference* and *individuation.* The earthern jar is regar-ded as such and is differentiated from the earthen bowl in so far as we allow ourselves to be illusionised as regards their common cause, viz clay. ('*yathā, saumya, ekena mritpindena sarvam mrinmayam vijnātam syād, vācārambhanam vikaro namadheyam mrittika ityeva satyam*"—Chhāndogya VI. i. 1.). Thus the "names" and "forms" of "jar" and "bowl" which constitute the individuality and difference of these objects are mere empty husks of reality and not the reality itself; they are, in the language of Plato, the "imperfect adumbra-tions of the Ideas." The principle of Māyā, "the matrix of all 'names' and 'forms' ", thus furnishes the *principium in-dividuasionis* as well as the *principium divisionis* of the entire system of things.

Maya is, to recepitulate, that principle of ignorance which makes us think of things both as *sat* or real, and as *asat* or unreal; which, in other words, unifies contradictories, and which constitutes individuality and diversity of things which are but "names" and "forms" hypostatized. And the world of our experience which teems with individualities, and diffe-rences, spatial, temporal, or constitutional, and which har-bours contradictories of the real and the unreal is thus redu-ced to Māyā or illusion.

Can there be any other conclusion than the above which is more shocking to the imagination of one who is accustomed to the realistic grooves of thinking? Indeed the Realist will startle back when he will be asked to accept the entire fabric of his real world as a will-o'-the-wisp! But the *Advaitavādin* clearly and distinctly points out the three different strata of existence: (i) the *prātibhāsika* stratum in which the existence of an illusory object is but momentary, as that of silver in the case of the ordinary illusory preception of nacre, for the silver disappears as soon as it is pointed out that what one takes for silver is not silver but nacre; (ii) the *vyāvahārika*-stratum in which the system of things is *practically real* or *empirically certain* so as to render possible the ordinary affairs of the work-a-day world: to this belongs the system of scientific truths; and (iii) the *pāramārthika*-stratum, in which nothing but the absolute homogenous unity of *Brahman* is real and existent, and every thing else which harbours difference is unreal.

The first-mentioned stratum is not very important for our present purpose. If we take the distinction between the *vyāvaharika* and the *pāramārthika* strata in a little wider sense we may very well maintain that the distinction is only a general hint as to the *Relativity of Apprehension.* What is real or existent from the *vyāvahārika* stand-point, that is from the stand-point of a particular inquirer with a special interest and a particular type of intellectual capacity, proves unreal or non-existent from a higher point of view, where the interest is wider and the powers of apprehension keener and more penetrative. And the same stand-point which seems *pāramārthika* or higher is itself found to be lower or *vyāvahārika* only by an inquirer of higher intellectual powers. Thus the distinction between the two strata is entirely relative and also *truth is relative to the inquirer*, and the relation between the reality of the

system of empirical truths on the one hand and capacity of apprehension on the other, may be said to be one of inverse variation. The wider one's outlook—the more analytic one's apprehension—the less and less real do the objects with their individualities and differences begin to appear—they seem to dismantle themselves of their cloaks of false realities one after another as one's capacity of apprehension gains in depth and minuteness of analysis, until finally, the absolutely *pāramārthika* or real stage is reached where there is no further *vyāvahārika* stratum possibly thinkable, and in which the absolute reality of *Brahman* in its indeterminate homogeneous eternity is realised. Now this absolute reality of *Brahman* is identical with Knowledge and Existence, Thought and Being. We can very well understand how this is so, when we sublate the knowledge of objects of the empirical world one after another as unreal in our *vyavaharika* stages, and find that it is *Knowledge* as foundational, and of the highest order, which is sublating that of the lower order. Proceeding in this way it is possible to reach the highest or the absolutely *paramarthika* stage where there is no *dvaita* or difference but *pure monistic knowledge* (*advaitajnāna*) in which all distiction of subject and object and even the activity—or in the language of Plotinus—*nous*, *noeton* and *noesis* merges into one homogeneous whole, and that is *Brahman.*

It is worth while to note that the Relativity of Apprehension which is the fundamental principle of all attempt to know the world and which, as we have seen, follows from the Vedantic conceptions of the *pāramārthika* and *vyāvahārika* strata of knowledge is not the same as the Protagorean Subjectivism or what is otherwise known as *Homo Mensura* doctrine, that all knowledge is a matter of individual standpoint and that the individual is the standard of every thing that is true and good. So long as men are within the char-

med circle of *Māyā* things will appear in their differences and will be taken in the same light and in the same sense, thus making universal standard possible within that circle. The Lilliputain must have his Lilliputian standard. There are indeed planes or zones of certitude corresponding to the degree of apprehensive powers. What is real or true to the popular mind is certainly not so to the scientific mind and what is real or true to the scientific mind may not be so to the philosophic mind which moves in another and higher plane. But as soon as the magical wand is touched and the cup broken, the magical reality of the empirical world with its "names" and "forms," its infinite conditions of individuality and difference shrivels into non-entity. The firm grasp of the quiescent unity of *Brahman* dissipates all difference (*dvaita*). Here we have an important distinction between the Vedantic and Hegelian conception of the Law of Contradiction. In Vedanta unity or identity is the truth, and difference is illusory, and even the negation of the difference through which the identity is affirmed is illusory. Hegel on the other hand points out that it is not the undifferenced unity, but unity-in-difference that constitutes the truth which is thus the home of contradictories. *Advaitism*, however, does not altogether deny the importance of difference and individuality which co exist with unity but only relegates them to a lower or inferior plane. The world of our experience which manifests unity-in-difference is regarded as real from the *vyāvahāric* standpoint or from the standpoint of practical or empirical truth, and not from the point of view of monistic consiousness (*advaitajnāna*), and here it is worth while to remember Herbart's criticism of Hegel that the union of contradictories is only an empiricism.

The Relativity of Apprehension, which, we have seen, is the natural outcome of the Vedantic distinction between the three strata of existence, appears to be the greatest logical and

epistemological lesson for science and philosophy. It is the basic principle of the supposition of rival hypotheses and shows that any attempt to apprehend the world, however sound, is only a *working hypothesis* standing every moment in danger of being superseded by a better one.

Beginning from our ordinary practical life we find that what appears true, real and important from one stand-point is far from being so from a higher or more comprehensive stand-point. To the man who is thirsty and feels a longing for a glass of cold water, the water is as real as any thing could be, but the chemist whose stand-point and interest are different from those of the thirsty man will take water to be unreal, what is real and true to him is the H^2O. Again from the point of view of the physicist the H^2O is as unreal as the water and what is real and true is the *energy* or force to which he will reduce every thing and in terms of which he will explain every thing. May it not be further asked if the true nature of this physical energy has yet been determined ? All this therefore points to the conclusion that every object of this empirical world may thus be regarded as both real and unreal, existent and not existent. The line of argument adopted by *advaitism*, therefore, far from contradicting European common sense and scientific spirit, is in perfect conformity with it; and reveals the further fact that this highest specimen of philosophical speculation was discovered by the Indian sages in a remote age when the modern European scientific spirit was scarcely born. Therefore the unreality of the empirical world on which the *advaitavādin* insists is not of the type of the will-o-the-wisp, but indirectly reveals the relative incompetency of human apprehension consequent upon man's finitude and imperfection (*satyasya tattvam nihitam guhāyām*).

This important lesson of the Vedānta may be very well

brought home to our minds when we take into consideration the results of scientific researches of modern times. Ptolemaic astronomy regarded the earth to be an immobile central body round about which the other members of the system moved; Copernicus demonstrated that this was illusory, a Māyā;—the earth was not the immobile central body but it is one of the many moving bodies revolving round about the sun which lies at the centre of the system and which is relatively stationary.

The ancient Greek atomist Democritus maintained that the ultimate constituents of our world were *atoms* which were inert, indivisible minute bodies—each being a *plenum* or portion of space entirely filled and therefore impenetrable. This statical theory of atoms, however, failing to account for motion was regarded as illusory or unreal, and had to make room for the dynamical hypotheses of Faraday and Lord Kelvin. Faraday demonstrated that the atoms were not inert as Democritus supposed, but that they were elastic and compressible so much so that they render possible the interaction of things. And Lord Kelvin supposed the atoms to be like "vortex rings" or whirlpools in the perfect fluid known as the ether of space and the properties of such vortices were demonstrated mathematically by Helmholtz to possess self-sufficiency and durability required of the ultimate units of matter.

Later researches, however, tend to show that the so-called atom which was regarded as the simplest possible constituent of matter is really far more complex than Faraday's "centres of forces" and than lord Kelvin's "vortex rings"—a reservoir of forces in moving equilibrium, of unthinkable complexity, capable of being liberated and of passing over into free force of motion again—"a solar system in miniature"—but possibly immensely more complex than the solar system of the sun

planets and moons we are acquainted with. The atom is, thus thought to be composed of *many minuter units* revolving round one another and about a common centre with inconceivable rapidity and holding one another together in moving equilibrium rendered stable by the excessive velocity of the revolving units. But though comparatively stable, its equilibrium is extremely sensitive and constantly being modified by external influences and capable of being partly or wholly disintegrated—the constituent units being thereby liberated and left to move with inconceivable rapidity through space. These minuter units are called *ions* or *electrons*. They form the *atoms* by their equilibrated revolutions and are themselves possibly whirlpools of the luminiferous ether.

From this it also follows that the atoms are not indesturctible. They are *produced* by the integration of finer elements into equilibrated systems and can possibly be *destroyed* by the disruption of these electrons; and this would appear to be the case from the phenomena of radio-activity which are due to the spontaneous disruption of the atoms.

Now does not the above examination of the Atomic theory of the universe and its replacement by the Electron-theory, not excluding the possibility that the latter again would make room for quite another and a better one in future, confirm our belief in the position of the *Māyāvādin* that the apparently real world in which we live and move is scarcely more reliable than the magician's jugglery? Interpret and understand the world in any way you like, but the next moment you will be in a difficulty to reconcile yourself to what you believed with regard to it. You were at perfect liberty to suppose that the ultimate constituents of the material world were the atoms or indestructible and indivisible centres of energy, and you are now disillusionised to find that they are neither indivisible, being made up of electrons,

nor are indestructible, disruptions and reintegrations of the constituent elements giving rise to destruction and reconstruction of fresh atoms.

Again let us consider the fate of the old Ether-theory. Lord Kelvin writes in his *Popular Lectures and Addresses*: "You can imagine particles of some thing, the thing whose motion constitutes light. This thing you call luminiferous *ether*. This is the only substance we are confident of in dynamics. One thing we are sure of and that is the *reality and substantiality of the luminiferous ether*." Indeed unless a material medium for its propagation is either assumed or found, the phenomenon of light cannot be mechanically described, nor again other forms of variation as well as electricity and magnetism. And the additional advantage of this hypothesis is that it affords the ground for unity among the variety of physical facts.

Now the hypothesis of an imponderable, inert, luminiferous ether as something having "reality and substantiality" has been resorted to by scientists like Lord Kelvin, because they assume covertly or overtly, the a *priori* necessity of the mechanical theory of the universe. Here their argument seems to involve the following steps. Grant first that the world must be intelligible, grant secondly, that to be intelligible it must be mechanical, and grant finally, that to be mechanical there must be an ether or ethers whose motions constitute light, electro-magnetism, etc., grant all this and then we might say that the existence of ether is *indirectly proved*. The first two steps in this argument, it will be observed, are quite philosophical, but the second, however, is very disputable philosophy. Science, however, has no right to build on philosophical premises and is forward always to disown all such a *priori* methods. Leave aside then any presuppositions of this kind and ether remains but a mechanical hypothesis. No doubt its value as a descriptive hypothesis has been greatly enhanced by the labours of Maxwell and Hertz. But as to the worth of their results, one may suppose, Poincare's remark upon it is not too cautious: "There still remains much to be done; the identity of light and electricity is from to-day something more than a seducing hypothesis; it is a probable truth, but it is not yet a proved truth."*

The scientific world has been enjoying for some time the benefit of the investigations of Maxwell and Hertz until recently Einstein, in his Theory of Relativity, and Hooper, the Fellow of the Royal Astronomical Society, who had in reality anticipated Einstein, have revolutionised the entire scientific world. Hooper is declaring at the present day, in the Royal Astronomical Society, and before the whole scientific world that the old theory of an imponderable fixed ether is inadequate to solve many a problem of etherial physics such, for example, as that of the continued rotation of planets on their axes, or of the alteration of the inclination of the earth's axis to the magnetic equator. Experiments performed by Michelson and Morley, of America, have proved beyond doubt that the old theory of inert ether is entirely wrong, while Fitzgerald's photographs of the advancing wave of light prove that the wave-front, instead of being homogeneous, is broken up into thousands of points. And Hooper concludes that ether is the primary form of matter and possesses all the properties of matter. It is atomic, possesses elasticity because it is atomic, possesses density and different degrees of density in space, and also possesses inertia. The *ether atoms are subject to the law of gravity* just like any other form of matter and this is in conformity with the results of Planck and it satisfies all the rules of Newtonian Philosophy. This new theory of an ether subject to gravity will compel us to

* *Nature* Vol. I, 1894, p. 11.

alter all our preconceived ideas of space and especially of ether-atoms in relation to solar and planetary bodies.

So far matters are clear. But can all this be more than a mere hypothesis? Can it claim to have reached the final solution of the protean complexity of the entire system of the solar universe? Can we not as well expect that just as Maxwell and Hertz have been superseded at the present day by Einstein and Hooper, even so the day shall come when Einstein and Hooper will also be superseded in their turn by successors of greater scientific acumen?

Does not all this confirm once more the vedantic viewpoint that what appears to be 'real' and 'substantial' from a particular angle of vision is proved merely illusory, unreal or unreliable from a more comprehensive stand-point? Trace the whole history of human attempts to understand the nature and the system of things from the so-called scientific or philosophic point of view either in its outline or in its details, what do you find, but an alternation of truth and untruth, of reality and unreality; and the conclusion with which one is to remain satisfied is, therefore, that truth or reality is only relative to the knower, or that truth recedes further as the inquirer approaches. This puts one in mind of what the poet said,—

> "I am a part of all that I have met;
> Yet all experience is an arch wherethro'
> Gleams that untravell'd world whose margin fades
> For ever and for ever when I move."

We are reminded here also of Kant's discussion of the cosmological antinomies, that the world of empirical reality is not the true essence of things—it is merely an unreality, an appearance and not the thing in itself. And we are glad to find the same conception of the world confirmed by so eminent a scientific thinker as Herbert Spencer, who describes "science as a gradually increasing sphere," such that "every addition to its surface does but bring it into wider contact with surrounding nescience." Our knowledge

is not only bounded by an ocean of ignorance, but intersected and cut up, as it were, by straits and seas of ignorance; the *orbis scientiarum*, in fact, if we could but map out our ignorance as we map out our knowledge, would be little better than an archipelago, and would show much more an unexplored sea than land.

And this is what the *Māyāvādin* insists on when he presses forward the point that the whole *vyāvahārika* or empirical world is a huge illusion. And all science and philosophy, however much they might boast of their achievements, point to the irresistible conclusion that truth is relative to the apprehensive power of the inquirer—and that it recedes as the latter advances—and that the root principle of the universe is never to be discovered, and that the many theories that have been propounded about this root principle are *only relatively true* This is the most valuable lesson that the *Māyāvāda* teaches in the celebrated verse of the Brihadāranyaka,—*yasyāmatam tasya matam, matam yasya na veda sah* —"those who pretend to know, really know nothing, but those who say that they do not know are the real knowers." And the same truth flashed upon the great ancient Greek Vedantin, Socrates, the father of European philosophy in the true sense of the term, and he declared that "he knew that he did not know." *Māyāvāda* is thus not the ordinary *Illusionism* by which name it is often stigmatised, nor will it be properly characterised if one calls it *Agnosticism*, as it never shuts out all knowledge; but it is rather *Relativism*, pointing always to the *relative* or *tentative* character of the knowledge of the world of things in which we live and move, and insisting on the constant revision of it standpoints,—on the "transvaluation of all values,"—an intellectual attitude quite in keeping with the testimony of Modern Science and Philosophy.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GAUḌAPĀDA.

Of all the systems of Indian thought that of Vedānta has undoubtedly been the greatest living spiritual force which has determined the practical and speculative life of the people. And it would not be going too far from the truth to say that of all the different schools of Vedāntism, it is the Advaita School that has received the widest acceptance from the Indian mind as it has most strongly appealed to its taste and temperament and has most convincingly satisfied the demands of its keen intellect and lofty imagination. Now, this Advaita School of Vedānta philosophy, which might be traced to the hymns of the Ṛg Veda, and which has its chequered history through the earlier Upaniṣads—sometimes looming large as in the pure Idealism of Yājñavalkya-Maitreyī symposium and sometimes obscured by realistic, pluralistic and nihilistic lines of thought, traceable to the cooperative and syncretic work that the Upaniṣads are—owes its first clearer formulation to the epoch-making genius of Gauḍapāda; the Advaitism of Śankara being a fuller development of the nucleus of this absolutist thought propounded by Gauḍapāda, with modifications of his own. Besides, the age and atmosphere to which Gaudapāda belonged was surcharged with traits of Buddhistic thought and consequently his philosophy is of perennial interest for the historian of Indian Philosophy. The philosophy of Gauḍapāda thus represents a line of thought which was emerging from the vague glimmerings of the Upaniṣadic horizon on the one side, and which, while so emerging, was at the same time outshining the opposite horizon of Buddhistic subjectivism and nihilism on the other. My object in this present article is to indicate in general outline how the philosophy of Gauḍapāda has given to the idealism of the Upaniṣads a definite monistic

direction and mould, avoiding at the same time the Scylla and Charybdis of Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda, a more detailed treatment of other aspects of his philosophy being reserved for other occasions.

The central proposition of Gauḍapāda is that what is, is one, unborn *(aja)*, awake *(anidra)*, dreamless *(asvapna)* consciousness which is self-illumined *(prabhātam bhavati svayam)* and which is the only reality, and which is identical with Ātman. Hence it follows that reality or existence belongs only to Ātman or absolute self-consciousness and all else is unreal. The world of our experience with its diverse contents, physical and mental, is a figment of our imagination (*Māyāmātramidam dvaitam advaitam paramārthataḥ*). Gauḍapāda maintains that the reality of a thing consists in "that which is complete in itself, that which is its very condition, that which is unborn, that which is not accidental or that which does not forego its own character."* Thus the test of reality being immutable persistence for all eternity and neither objectivity nor practical efficiency, and such a test being satisfied in quiescent or tranquil self-consciousness which is Ātman, it follows that the world of our experience or *Jagatprapañca* which is the field of change and becoming must be unreality. Now Gauḍapāda has confirmed this his metaphysical conclusion as to the nullity of the *Jagatprapañca* by a psychological analysis of experience—first of all by pointing out the similarity of the waking world to the world of dream-consciousness, and secondly by showing that the moulds of time, space and causality into which the world of our experience is cast, are themselves meaningless and hence the world of our experience also is a mere unreality.

The most obtrusive reality which enforces itself upon our

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* Sāṃsiddhikī, svābhāvikī sahajā akṛtā ca yā
Prakṛtiḥ seti vijñeyā svabhāvaṃ na jahāti yā, IV. 9.

consciousness is the reality of the waking world whose existence our senses refuse to deny. Gauḍapāda disillusions us by pointing out in a manner similar to Descartes' that the waking world is no more real than the world of our dream-consciousness.† Just as the objects of waking consciousness are nullified in dreams even so the objects of our dream-consciouness cease to exist with the dawn of our waking life. Experiences in dreams are coherent in their own order as much as experiences in waking life are, but each of the two sets of experience is unreal in an absolute sense. But Gauḍapāda differs from Descartes in so far as Descartes assigns to the world a second-hand reality derived from the reality of God. Gauḍapāda also differs in this point from Śankara, though they are at one in their ultimate position that Brahman or Ātman is real and the phenomenal world is unreal. For while Gauḍapāda argues out the unreality of the world by demonstrating that the waking world is on a par with the dream-world, Śankara keeps up in a pronounced manner a distinction between the dream-world, dream and the waking-world by assigning to them different degrees of reality, though however he comes to the conclusion common with Gauḍapāda that both the worlds melt into the ultimate reality of Brahman. Thus it follows that Gauḍapāda tends more towards subjectivism than Śankara who retains in his system realistic elements in a relative and not an absolute sense.

Now the subjectivism of Gauḍapāda received its colouring from the line of the *Vijñānavāda* argument which he appropriates and uses to refute the standpoint of the Realist, without however identifying himself with the Vijñānavādin.*

† Gaudapāda's Kārikā, II, 4 and 7.

* Prajñapteh sanimittatvam ityādi etadantam, vijñānavādino baudhasya vacanam bāhyārthavādipakṣa-pratiṣedhaparam ācāyrena anumoditam. Śankara's commentary on Kārikā, IV. 28.

The contention of the Realist is that the world of objects exists outside and independently of our mind as the determining cause of the varieties of our cognition *(prajñapti)* and feeling *(kleśasyopalabdhiśca)*. But Gauḍapāda points out that the extramental world is as much unreal as the mental world, that the relation of the percipient and the perceived is only apparent and not real, each of these two terms of the relation having derived their air of reality from the movement of consciousness *(vijñānaspanditam)* quite in the same manner as the line of fire of a fire-brand (*alāta*) appears straight or curved according to the different kinds of its movement. And just as on the cessation of all movement of fire-brand all linear differences in the fire disappears, even so on the cessation of *citta* which grows and dies and is not a reality, all differences between the mental and the material world disappears. All duality is mental,* and whatever is mental is ultimately unreal, and if mentality or understanding could be sublated (*amanībhāve*), there would be no cognition of any duality which is the soul of the empirical existence. Now the very mind or *citta* or *vijñānam* is an *ābhāsa* or unreality, for mind or *citta* grows or becomes, and whatever grows or becomes is unreal. Gauḍapāda thus goes beyond the *vijñānavādin* in so far as he points out that vijñānam or *citta* which becomes is not the basic principle but an unreal aberration of one unitary changeless self-consciousness or Ātman in relation to which all changes are unmeaning. Hence the world of experience which is mind-begotten (manah-kalpitam) is as unreal as the mind itself from which it is projected.

Then from this negative attitude to the world of experience he proceeds to give us a constructive conception of the ultimate reality by a subtle dialectic which at once reminds

* Manodṛśyamidam dvaitam yat kincit sacarācaram Manasohyamanībhāve dvaitam naivopalabhyate. III. 31.

one of Nāgārjuna.§ He points out that the unreality of the world of experience suggests the reality of something which transcends experience, something which persists as a transcendent onlooker through the transient modifications of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep, and it would be complete nihilism to deny all reality as is done in the Mādhyamika system of thought; and this reality is thus identical with pure thought or consciousness. He goes on to say that reality alone *is*, and never becomes; change, becoming and origination are foreign to the nature of reality. For origination is itself an unreality. Origination to be a reality must be either self-origination or other-origination, but neither is possible. For we cannot imagine the origination of a water-pot from its own nature (*svatah*), nor can we reconcile ourselves to the belief that a thing can originate out of another thing (*paratah*) of its kind. And if it be maintained that the earthen jar originates from a source other than itself, *viz.*, from earth, then we must point out that all ideas of existence, origination and decay are forms of speech and not representing anything in reality corresponding to them. Further a thing can either be or not be. Now if a thing is, then no becoming or origination; and if a thing is not, then also no origination, for origination of a non-existent thing is as absurd as the origination of the horns of a hare. And even if a thing is both *is* and *is not*, even then also origination is meaningless in respect of either of its aspects. Thus Gauḍapāda concludes that since origination or change is foreign to reality and all changes belong to the world of experience which is looked down upon, as it were, by a transcendent metempiric consciousness, the ultimate reality is then that absolute consciousness or Ātman, 'the ever unborn,

§ Mādhyamika kārikā. Nirvāṇaparīkṣā, Ch. 25, p. 197 ff. (B. t. s.)

awake and dreamless, that illumines itself by itself.' And the finite consciousness or *citta* whose nature is origination and change is responsible for the world of experience which is the realm of duality. Now when the *citta* is dissolved, the world of diversity and change is dissolved along with it, and the translucent absolute reality of the Ātman shines forth in its own light.

The above may be said to be a synoptic representation of Gauḍapāda's general philosophical standpoint in relation to the dominant current of Vedāntic thought that permeated the Hindu mind of that age and to the Buddhistic lines of thinking which were still ringing in the ears of the generation which had just passed the age of Asanga, Asvaghoṣa and Nāgārjuna.

Now, before I close I deem it worth while to refer to the question whether Gauḍapāda was a Buddhist or belonged to the orthodox Brāhmaṇical School, and, along with it, to the allied question whether Gauḍapāda was the first inaugurator of Advaita Vedāntism. As regards the latter question it may be urged that there seems to be no tangible evidence that between the older Upaniṣad age and Śankara there appeared any individual philosopher who may be credited with the formulation of Advaitism excepting Gauḍapāda. As Dr. Dasgupta puts it, "I do not know of any Hindu writer previous to Gauḍapāda who attempted to give an exposition of the monistic doctrine (apart from the Upaniṣads) either by writing a commentary as did Śankara, or by writing an independent work as did Gauḍapāda."

There is, however, another hypothesis* that the origin of the Advaita school may be pushed beyond Gauḍapāda to Upavarṣa, the reputed Mīmāṃsa philosopher as its real founder. Such a hypothesis is based on the ground that

* *Cf* Dr. Guha's Introduction to his "Jivātman in Brahmasūtras."

Śankara has referred to him twice in his *Bhāṣya* as *Bhagavān Upavarṣa,* and that in the earlier part of his commentary on the Mīmāṃasā philosophy *(prathame tantre)* where he has the occasion to deal with the reality of the soul, Upavarṣa makes a promise to take up the problem in detail in the supplementary part of his commentary on the Śārīraka or the soul.* But in view of the fact that there is really nothing more than mere promise of a contemplated commentary on the Śārīraka available, it would be a gratuitous assumption to say that Upavarṣa was the founder of the Advaita school, of which Gauḍapāda is consequently a later exponent. In the absence of positive evidence in favour of Upavarṣa, and in the face of the fact that Śankara himself distinctly mentions in his commentary on the opening verse of the fourth chapter of the Kārikās that Gauḍapāda is the founder of the Advaita school† it is difficult to deny Gauḍapāda the credit of a founder of Advaitism. And Śankara's recognition of Gauḍapāda as the founder of Advaita school and as the teacher of his teacher whose tenets he is traditionally said to have been trained by the latter to represent and defend, and Gauḍapāda's intrinsic doctrinal difference from what either the Vijñānavādin maintained or the Śūnyavādin denied, force one to the conclusion that Gauḍapāda was a Hindu philosopher, and not a Buddhist, and was the first to promulgate the Advaita Vedāntism after the earlier Upaniṣad period.

There are, however, two things which have led some writers to surmise that Gauḍapāda was a Buddhist and not a Hindu. The one is that there are several instances of similarity in expressions, such as, *prapañcopaśama, saṃvṛti, jāti,* in the sense of origination, *dharma* in the sense of quality or

* *Vide* Brahma-Sūtras, III. 3, 53.

† Advaitadarsanasampradāyakartuh advaitasvarupeṇaiva namaskārārthoyam ādyah ślokah. Śankara's Com. on the 1st Kārikā, Ch. IV.

entity, the simile of the *alātacakra* which are common to Gauḍapāda and Nāgārjuna, and specially the similarity in the following parts of their respective verses *sambuddha stamvande dvipadāmvaram* (G. IV. 1.) and *sambuddhastamvande vadatāmvaram.* (N. I.) And the other reason is that Gauḍapāda's method of dialectic is leavened with the Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda spirit, as we have already hinted at. Dr. Daspupta has based his conclusion that Gauḍapāda was himself a Buddhist on these evidences; and the special point worthy of note in this connection is that the expression, *asparśa-yoga,* has been interpreted by him as *"probably* referring to Nirvāṇa."*

But we would venture to differ in this point from the learned Doctor, and would like to point out that this similarity in form and matter of Gauḍapāda's arguments is indeed a similarity, but does not, however, on that account argue him a Buddhist any more than the sophistical expressions and dialectic used by Socrates make him a sophist or Kantian. Besides all the assertions of the learned Doctor with regard to Gauḍapāda's adherence to Buddhism are scarcely more than problematic. "I believe," he says "that there is sufficient evidence in his Kārikās for thinking that he was *possibly* himself a Buddhist and considered that the teachings of the Upaniṣads tallied with those of Buddha." Then he whittles down the force of his problematic remark by further adding that, "it is immaterial whether he was a Hindu or Buddhist, so long as we are sure that he had the highest respect for the Buddha and for the teachings he believed to be his."† Certainly to have regard for a particular tenet or philosophy or religion and its founder is not equivalent to identifying oneself with that tenet.

As regards his adoption of the so-called Buddhistic expressions it may be pointed out that the expressions, *prapañco-*

* Dr. Das Gupta's History of Indian Philosophy. Vol. I. P. 423.

† Ibid. P. 429.

paśamam, śivam and the like which are said to point to Nāgārjuna's terminology, are no less the watch-words of the Upaniṣadic teachers. In fact they occur within the very Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad (Ślokas 7 and 12), which Gauḍapāda undertakes to explain. As for the specific expression, *asparśa-yoga*, which Dr. Dasgupta interprets as "probably referring to Nirvāṇa," it may be urged that in the two places where that expression occurs (Kārikā III,39,and IV, 2),there is the unmistakable reference from the context to the relationless self-consciousness or Ātman difficult of realisation even by the Yogin. Nor can we lay Gauḍapāda down as a Buddhist for the similarity of his dialectic to that of Nāgārjuna either. For to think that a fullfledged propounder of the Upāniṣad doctrine was ignorant of dialectical argument, so much so that he must have imitated Nāgārjuna in this matter, is to ignore the entire trend of Upaniṣad teachings. And apart from this general relation even specific instances of dialectic argument resembling that of Nāgārjuna are not infrequent in the Upaniṣads. The very seventh Śloka of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad which he undertakes to annotate and to elaborate runs as, "*nāntahprajñam na bahihprajñam nobhayatahprajñam, na prajñānaghanam na prajñam nāprajñam,*" and this is apparently a facsimile of the dialectic which Nāgārjuna has employed in his attempt to determine the nature of Nirvāṇa among other things. Moreover, supposing that Gauḍapāda was a Buddhist there seems to be no ostensible reason why he of all Buddhists has taken care to expound any of the Upaniṣads, the sacred texts of the anti-Buddhistic cult.

The real situation seems to be this that Gauḍapāda who was inspired with the subtle monistic idealism of the Upaniṣads had to meet the arguments of Buddhism which had just established its stronghold upon the Indian mind by the great genius of Asanga, Asvaghoṣa and Nāgārjuna previous to him,

and therefore he could not but be largely influenced by the line and spirit of their arguments and also could not possibly establish his own stand-point against Buddhism without meeting its votaries on their own grounds. That he was not a Buddhist and that his doctrine differs fundamentally from that of the Buddhist, have been emphatically pointed out by himself in so many words when he says, "*naitad buddhena bhāṣitam,*" where he finally distinguishes his own position from that of the Buddhist of the Vijñānavāda school by insisting that the one ultimate reality of the Ātman which transcends all relation of knowledge, knower and the known, has never been posited by Buddha. It is more proper, perhaps, to say that Gauḍapāda cast the Buddhist line of thought into the Vedāntic mould than to think that Gauḍapāda was a Buddhist, or was at least a crypto-Buddhist.

THE JAINA CONCEPTION OF TRUTH AND REALITY.

The central problem of Jaina thought is Man in all his relations to the universe which is attempted to be accounted for and explained only in so far as it bears on human life and existence. The Jaina ethics is an elaborate consideration of the conditions of bondage and emancipation of man. The God of the Jaina Religion is no Absolute and Transcendental Being who looks down upon the mortals below from his sidereal seat, but is the *Jina* or Man-God, that is, one who had been one amongst us, but exalted to the status of a god by his own efforts, by the attainment of consummation in the cognitive, emotive and conative aspects of his life. In Psychology the Jaina has come upon his concept of soul not by way of searching after the self-existent and unchangeable principle in the ever changing world of phenomena like the Upaniṣads, but rather by way of *perception of life* which is of more immediate interest for man than everything else in the universe.* And the same dominating interest in Man has also been distinctly manifest in his conception of Truth and Reality. Thus the entire Jaina system may be said to have developed a distinctly biocentric or anthropocentric stand-point. And the present essay deals with the problem of Truth and Reality from the anthropocentric standpoint of the Jaina.

Now if, as already stated, the central problem of the Jaina system is man, then the knowledge and existence of the extra-mental world will have significance and value only in so far as such knowledge and existence affect the practical life of man. In other words, the test or standard of truth must be

* *Cf.* Dr. Jacobi's note in S. E. S. XXII, p. 3. and Deussen's "Philosophy of the Upanishads," Ch. XI.

pragmatic i. e., all genuine knowledge must aim at the fulfilment of some useful purpose, must lead the human agent to some useful activity. Knowledge, in order to be valid, must inform the subject of an object that would subserve some useful purpose for him; and if our knowledge of a particular object be such that thereby we are not at all helped to discern whether that thing is to be eschewed (*heya*) or accepted (*upādeya*), whether that thing will be of any service to us or not, then such knowledge is of little or no value in our practical life, and amounts to error and is termed *viparyaya*. The validity of knowledge is thus constituted by its practical consequence, by its verification. The truth of an idea or a judgment is not thus a property inherent in it; truth *happens* to an idea or a judgment. It *becomes* true, is *made* true by useful consequences.‡ Hence the Jaina urges that if as the Mīmāmsakas hold,§ truth were constituted by the very same conditions under which cognition as such arises, and not by anything extraneous to these conditions, as would follow from their *Swatahprāmāṇyavāda*, then it would hardly be possible to distinguish between right and false cognition between truth and error.†

The Buddhist account of the test of truth is also pragmatic. The Buddhist also states that the validity of knowledge consists in its verifiability, in its leading the agent to fruitful activity.¶ But though both Jainism and Buddhism agree in

‡ *Cf.* Parīkṣāmukhasutra, Ch. 1. i. and Prameyakamalamārtanda thereon.

§ *Cf.* James's Pragmatism, p. 201; "Tasmāt aprāmāṇyabat prāmāṇyamapi paratah eba utpadyate."—Nyāyadīpika. p. 5.

† Ibid, p. 5.

¶ Abisambādakam jnāñam samyagjñānam."—Nyāyabindutīkā, p. 3; Yataśca arthasiddhistat samyagjñānam.—Ibid, p. 6. Arthakriyāsamarthabastupradarśakam samyagjñānam.—Ibid, p. 8.

their affirmation that valid cognition always points to something leading to the fulfilment of a purpose, yet they differ from each other intheir ultimate reference (*pramāṇaphalam*). That conative fulfilment is the essential element in the validity of an idea is common ground for the Bauddha and the Jaina alike, and this is patent from their common use of the term *arthakriyākāritwa.** The concept of *arthakriyākāritwa* has, however borne not the same connotation with both.

A historical study of the concept of *arthakriyākāritwa* reveals that it was perhaps used for the first time in Buddhist literature by Dharmakirtti in his "Nyāyabindu" (650 A. D.), and that the earliest mention of it in Jaina literature appears to have been made by Akalankadeva (750 A. D.) in his commentary entitled Aṣtaśati on the Aptamimāṇsā of Samantabhadra. The *artha* of *arthakriyākāritwa*, however, has not throughout its history referred explicitly to human purpose (*puruṣārtha*) uniformly, so far as Buddhist literature is concerned, but it may be stated without fear of contradiction that there is in all cases at least an implicit reference to a purpose of some human agent.† In any case the Buddhist doctrine of *Sattwa* or existence does not refer to any abiding (*mitya*) reality apart from the series of ever-flowing

* The Buddhist doctrine of Existence or Reality : "*Sattwam arthakriyākāritwalakṣaṇam.*"— Sarbadarsanasamgraha, p. 15.

The Jaina doctrine of Existence or Reality: "Bastunastābadarthakriyākāritwam laksaṇam."—Syādvāda-manjari (Benares Edition), p. 19.

† *Cf.* Dr. Das Gupta's History of Indian Philosophy, pp. 154-55. and p. 163, and *vide* Aṣtasation Āptamīmāmsā, Ch. II. 33. For implicit and explicit reference to human purpose as far as traceable in Buddhist literature *vide* Dr. Das Gupta's History of Indian Philosophy ; and for Jaina reference, *vide* Syādvāda-manjari, Tarkarahasyadīpikā, etc.

phenomena each of which is new and different from the other (*swalakṣaṇam*). Each moment ushers into existence a new effect and each new effect as produced in each case means the coming into being of a correspondingly new existence of another phenomenon. *Sattwa* thus means nothing other than an impression produced on us; so that the idea of power as producing impressions and as making up the essence of a permanent entity has no meaning apart from the impressions themselves which succeed one another in time; and hence *arthakriyākāritwa* as constituting the essence of *Sattwa* means nothing more than mere empirical causality. The Buddhist account of the criterion of truth is thus pragmatic and is greatly akin to the pragmatism of William James in so far as it ends in a mere epistemological method, developed out of an empirical and psychological analysis of our actual facts of knowing, and as such shuts out all reference to ontological reality.

Here the Jaina joins issue with the Buddhist and points out that if *arthakriyākāritwa, i. e.*, leading to useful activity, be the criterion of truth then our inquiry must at once outstep the limits of epistemology and merge into the realm of metaphysics from which epistemology can hardly be separated except by abstraction. The *puruṣārtha* or subjective human purpose may be served by a world of objects which are by their very nature adequate for such purpose. Now experience and common sense tell us that our world is composed of a plurality of concrete objects which are neither absolutely immutable, nor absolutely mutable but which combine in themselves both characteristics. The concrete reality is thus constituted by some element which is permanent or immutable (*dhruba*) and by some element which is transitory or mutable, or subject to change or motion resulting in

emergence of new qualities (*utpādā*) and in loss or dissolution (*byaya*) of old ones.† In so far as the immutable element is concerned it is known as *dravya* and in so far as mutation is concerned it is known as *Paryāya.* Both *dravya* and *paryāya* elements enter into the nature of a concrete reality.§ Hence the Jaina points out that the Bauddha has really missed the significance of *arthakriyākāritwa* to have applied it to the world of objects which he conceives to be composed of momentary phenomena (*paryāyas*) only.

By using subtlest dialectical polemic the Jaina establishes that a momentary existence cannot exert *arthakriyākāritwa* or causal efficiency, as the Bauddha conceives it, either by way of succession or by way of simultaneity ¶ In the first instance, a momentary existence cannot exert causal efficiency by operating successively, for successive operation involves pervasion in point of space (*deśakritā byāpti*) as well as in point of time (*kālakritā byāpti*); but pervasion is an impossibility in the case of what is momentary. Nor can a momentary existence exert causal efficiency by way of simultaneity. If it could, then we would have to conceive that a momentary existence, say a seed, would simultaneously produce the manifold effect of absorbing heat and moisture, differentiating into sprout, etc., which are contrary to experience.

Now the Jaina contention is that just as the concept of *arthakriyākāritwa* does not consist with the Buddhist view of momentary existence as shown above, even so it does not apply to the world of objects viewed as wholly permanent (*ekānta nitya*). Suppose, if possible, that *arthakriyākāritwa* holds good of an immutable reality, then it holds good either

‡ *Cf.* "Utpādabyayadhraubyayuktam sat."—Tattwārthādhigama Sūtra. Ch. V. 29.

§ "Dravyam paryāyabiyutam paryāyā dravyabarjitāh. Kva kadā kena kimrūpā driṣtā mānena kenacit"

¶ "Sattvam arthakriyākāritwam tacca kramākramābhyām byāptam."—Syādvāda-manjari (Benares Edition), pp. 19-21.

by way of succession or by way of simultaneity. But *arthakriyākāritwa* does not really hold good of a permanent reality by way of *succession* (*kramena*). For succession involves lapse of time, and lapse of time implies inadequacy in the cause to produce the effect. For had it been adequately efficient then it would have produced the whole series of effects by its initial activity. And even waiving the lapse of time as the sign of inefficiency we are bound to affirm that if the cause, instead of producing the whole effect all at once, has to pass through successive moments of time, then it indicates that the cause has to depend upon the collocation of circumstances (*sahakāribhāvān*) which does not come to maturity by the first moment of its operation, and thus the cause is inadequate in itself to produce the effect. In other words, the Jaina thinks that the purely static conception of reality (*ekānta nitya*) is incompatible with the idea of causality. To be is not to do, bare unchangeable existence is no determinant of causality which is dynamic and which involves change and activity. And the Jaina disposes of the other alternative that *arthakriyākāritwa* holds good of a static reality by way of simultaneity, simply by pointing out that we never come across in our actual experience a case of a static reality producing the whole series of effects simultaneously, in its first moment of operation. Thus while the Buddhist doctrine of *Arthakriyākāritwa* stops short at pointing out merely that causal efficiency obtains amongst unconnected moments of phenomena without reference to any noumenal background, and that human cognition is to be judged valid in so far as some purpose of the subject is fulfilled by the cognition of such phenomena, with the Jaina it has acquired a more comprehensive and humanistic meaning in that it establishes the concrete character of reality which is not pure *being (ekānta nitya)* of the Vedāntist, nor pure *becoming* (*ekānta anitya* of the Buddhist) but which is both

in one, (*dravyaparyāyātmakambastu*). Hence while Buddhist pragmatism is anti-metaphysical, the pragmatism of the Jaina distinctly points to a pluralistic realism. But the Jaina has gone much further than this and has shown that the reality is indeterminate (*anekāntadharmātmak*), admitting of infinite number of ways of characterisation because of infinite number of qualities possessed by it. Hence any one judgment or affirmation represents only one out of innumerable points of view from which an object may be characterised and is partially or relatively true, always leaving room for alternative predication. And this partial or relative determination of reality in the face of its infinite potentiality is technically called *Naya** by the Jainas, according to whom therefore, the truth of a judgment becomes relative to the standpoint from which it is affirmed. The truth of any one affirmation is therefore only conditional and relative and becomes contradicted when conceived to form the absolute point of view, and thus becomes a *nayābhāsa* or semblance of *naya* which amounts to a fallacy. Hence it follows that all judgments or affirmations are true in some sense and false in another, there being no judgment which is absolutely true and none which is absolutely false.

Now the Jaina contends, very much in the same spirit, as the modern pragmatist, that in spite of the privative or relative character of specific concepts or judgments, the Vedāntist, the Sāṃkhya, the Nyāya-Vaiśeshika thinker, and the Buddhist have each in his own way taken specific concepts or judgments to represent the whole or absolute truth, and have been led to the supposition that because a thing has one definable character, it cannot have any other, that the formal principles of identity and contradiction have invulnerable rigidity alike in the realms of thought and things. An

* "Tatra anirākritapratipakṣo bastvaṃśagrāhi jñāturabhiprāyo nayah."—Prameyakamalamārtanda, Ch. 6.

unbiassed examination of facts, however, reveals the contrary: each object of our experience is a home of contradictions, a harbour of opposites. Hence the Jaina directs his dialectic skill against what James calls "Vicious Intellectualism or Abstractionism"* as exhibited by each of the Vedāntist, the Sāṃkhya, the Nyāya-vaiśeshika philosopher and the Buddhist in so far as each of them uses concepts *privatively* or confines them to one or other specific aspect of the concrete reality which is infinitely rich in characters *(Dharmas)*. To express the Jaina standpoint in the language of Prof. Perry, "The world may be truly conceived as permanent and unified, since it is such *in a certain respect*. But this should not lead us, as it has led certain intellectualists, to suppose that the world is therefore not changing and plural. We must not identify our world with one conception of it. In its concrete richness it lends itself to many conceptions. And the same is true of the least thing in the world. It has many aspects, none of which is exhaustive of it. It may be taken in many relations and orders, and be given different names accordingly."†

Then the Jaina proceeds further and says that this sort of abstractionism or Nayābhāsa is manifest not only in our representation of the world of objects as exclusively immutable (*nitya*) or exclusively mutable (*anitya*), but also in our application of the concepts of *universality* and *particularity*, *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* to them. The problem of the nature and relation between the universal and the particular has occupied the Jaina mind no less engrossingly than the world of Western thought and the solution it has proferred has ten-

* James' "Meaning of Truth", p. 249 and also "Pluralistic Universe", p. 218.

† Prof. Perry's "Present Philosophical Tendencies," p. 228.

ded to strengthen the *Anekāntavāda* or the doctrine of indeterminate reality. The non-dualistic Vedāntists maintain that the universal is real and that the distinctions and particularities, the world of our experience teems with, are but unreal modes (*bikāras*) which melt into nothingness before the universal *satta* which is real. The Buddhist on the other hand insists that what we really perceive is not the universal but particulars which are unique in themselves (*svalakṣaṇa*), our perception of a cow does not imply anything like the cow-essence (*gotva*) beyond the particular colour and the particular bodily configuration which make up the individuality of the cow.‡ Further the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika thinkers are supposed by the Jainas to admit the reality of the universal and the particular but not in their proper relation to each other.§ According to them the universal can exist apart from particular and particulars are also conceivable independently of the universal. They are as independent and exclusive of each other as fire and water. As to the question how the universal (*gotva*) and the particular *Śabaladhabalādi*) are found to co-exist (*Sāmānādhıkaraṇyam*) if they are mutually exclusive, the Naiyāyika and the Vaiśeṣika rejoind that such co-existence is more apparent than real: the universal is not immanent in the particulars, so that the reality is not universal-particular, but universal or particular according as the percipient emphasises the one or the other. Now the Jaina urges that neither exclusively in terms of the universal (*Sāmānya*), nor exclusively in terms of the particular (*Viśeṣa*) are we justified in conceiving the

‡ *Cf.* "Etāsu panchasvababhāsanīṣu
Pratyakṣabodhe sphutamangulīṣu
Sādhāraṇam rūpamabekṣate yah
Śringam śirasyātmana īkṣate sah."
Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts, edited by M. M. Haraprasad Shastri

§ *Cf.* Syādvāda-manjarī, pp. 19-21.

objects of experience; the conception of reality in terms of the abstract universal out of all relation to particulars is as incompatible with experience as the conception of reality constituted by abstract particularity. The object of our experience is a concrete reality where the universal embodies itself in the particular; the cow of our experience presents before our mind's eye not only the particularity which differentiates the cow from the buffalo and other animals but also the universal essence of 'cow'-ness (*gotva*) which permeates through all the animals denoted by the term cow. Then the universals are neither *ante res* nor *post res* but are *in rebus*, not transcendent over but immanent in the particulars.

The indeterminate character of reality is further brought out by the Jaina in another way. He thinks that the object of our experience is both existent (*sat*) as well as non-existent (*asat*). Our supposition of an object as a pure being is an abstraction and our taking it as pure non-existence also amounts to downright negation. What the Jaina wants to point out is that everything has its existence (*sattā*) without which no characterisation whatsoever is possible, but at the same time it is non-existent in the sense that it is characterised by the absence of the qualities of all other things but itself.¶ If a particular thing, say a pot, were purely non-existent, then the very that-ness, or *quidity* would have been an impossible conception. Hence the pot *per se* is necessarily existent in order to the very conception of it. On the other hand the qnalities of any other object, say of cloth, are not existent in the pot, so that the pot is non-existent in relation to the cloth. In other words every object *per se* is *sat*, but in relation to every other object is *asat*.

¶ "Sarbamasti svarūpeṇa Pararūpeṇa nāstica.
Anyathā sarbasattvam syāt svarupasyāpyasambhavah."

Thus the Jaina concludes that the world of objects, if they are objects at all for any human subject to whom they bear any significance and value, if they are not to belie their true characters as revealed by experience and common sense, must be conceived as indeterminate having infinite number of aspects; it is neither purely *dravya*, nor purely *paryāya*, neither purely *nitya* nor purely *anitya*, neither purely universal, nor purely particular, neither purely *sat*, nor purely *asat*; and so on, so that any one judgment or affirmation from any one standpoint, where there are really infinite number of standpoints corresponding to an infinite number of aspects of the concrete reality, can represent but a relative truth. Every judgment or affirmation is thus relative to the aspect of the reality it represents, and in order to avoid misconstruction that it represents the whole or absolute truth it must be conveyed by the reservation indicated by the expression *Syāt*. And hence we have what is known as the doctrine of *Syādvāda* or *Relativism* which is otherwise known as *Anekāntavād*.

Now this doctrine of Syādvāda or Relativism corresponding to the indeterminate character of reality has been developed into the famous *Saptabhanginaya* or the *doctrine of sevenfold judgment or predication* which is unique in the history of world-thought. From the doctrine of Relativism of knowledge it has been plain to us that what can be affirmed from one standpoint may also be denied from another; and since position (*bidhi*) and negation (*niṣedha*) can be conceived both in succession and simultaneity (*kramayaugapadyābhyām*) we can evolve the sevenfold way of predication. A careful student of Jaina dialectic will notice that from any one standpoint or *naya* we can evolve, with the help of *affirmation* and *negation* made both successively and simultaneously, the similar sevenfold predication in any case. Just as by fixing our attention on the particular *naya* or standpoint

of existence (*astitwa*) we can go on evolving the seven stages: *Syādasti, Syānnāsti, Syādasti Syānnāstica, Syādavaktavyam; Syadastica avaktavyamca, Syānnāstica avaktavyamca* and *Syādastica Syānnāstica avaktavyamca.* Similarly we may, from the standpoint of *nityatwa* or immutability make out the sevenfold predication: *Syādnityam, Syādanityam, Syādubhayam*, etc. Thus the Jaina contention is that the nature of reality is indeterminate and is conceivable in an infinite number of ways in accordance with the infinite number of aspects of a thing and that nothing short of the sevenfold judgment will fully represent even any one of the many standpoints from which an object can be looked at.*

Now bearing in mind that the Jaina doctrine of *Naya* and that of the *Saptabhanginaya* which grows out of the doctrine of Naya, have significance and value only with reference to the nature of reality conceived in relation to man, we now proceed to consider the further implications of the Jaina view of Truth and Reality. We have already noticed that from the Jaina account of *arthakriyākāritwa* the *truth* or validity of an idea or judgment is *made* or engendered by its leading to some fruitful activity. Now the question may legitimately arise as to *how reality is related to the making of truth.* If truth is truth for us, in so far as it answers to our purpose, is reality in the same sense reality for us? The Jaina holds that in the cognitive elaboration of experience both truth and reality grow up *pari passu.* It is in our attainment of valid knowledge that we make reality so far as it is cognisable. Epistemologically therefore, *i.e.*, so far as our knowledge can go, there is a sense in saying that the

* Bikalādesāswabhāvā hi nayasaptabhangī bastvamśamātraprarūpakatwāt, sakalādeśaswabhāvāhi pramāṇasaptabhangī yathābat bastuprarūpakatwāt.—
Prameyakamalamartnada, Ch. VI, p. 206b.

making of truth and making of reality are identical. But metaphysically speaking we must make a distinction between reality that is made and reality that is. The *Anekāntavāda* of the Jaina conceives reality as indeterminate and infinite potentiality, which serves as a sort of inexhaustible reserve of objective reality but which yet perpetually grows up into the reality of our own knowing and therefore of our own making. Jainism is thus no scepticism or agnosticism, landing us into the absolute doubt as to reality, or into the unknowable things-in-themselves of Kant or into the Spencerian transfigured Realism, according to which we are debarred from knowing the Absolute Reality "in the strict sense of knowing." Jaina indeterminism is a form of realism, but it differs from modern realism in that it, instead of conceiving, like the latter, a plurality of determinate truths, goes beyond it to show that each truth admits of an infinite number of alternative judgments. Further the Jaina theory is almost an incontrovertible rejoinder against the conception of independent reality which the metaphysics of absolutism and realism agree in misinterpreting as one of total absence of dependence upon human experience. The absolutist and realistic metaphysics errs in so far as it supposes that in the cognitive transaction it is the subject only and not the object as well, that undergoes transformation. Now it is highly interesting to note that in the Jaina system it is maintained that both the subject or the knower, and the object in so far as it is known, are *altered* by the cognitive process. A reality may be regarded as independent† of our knowing or as affected or *altered* by it according as it is not or *it is aware of being known.*

Now a reality can be said to be transformed in the *sense*

† *Cf.* Schiller: Studies in Humanism, Ch. XIX, pp. 439-44.

of being aware of being known only on the condition that it is endowed with some form of psychical life. The Jaina holds that the whole of the universe is endowed with psychical life of different degrees of intensity.‡ "Everything from the solar system to the dewdrop has a soul, and not merely men and animals. The whole universe is full of minute beings called nigodas; they are groups of infinite number of souls forming very small clusters having respiration and nutrition in common and experiencing extreme pains, so that there are souls even in so-called inanimate objects called metals and stones." Now this *hylo-zoistic* or more properly speaking, *panpsychist* view of the universe as held by the Jaina lends an additional support to our interpretation of his view that in our act of knowing an object, in our cognitive manipulation of it, it may be said to be aware of being known in some sense and therefore said to be *altered* or made by us. In one word, there is, *in some sense, the actual making of reality by us, as there is the making of truth.* And so far Jainism answers to a great extent to the present-day Humanism of Schiller.

We conclude here that the Jaina system as an independent venture of the Indian mind, is of great philosophical importance for the comparative study of the present-day problems of Western thought. It has, as we have seen, developed a Pragmatic Epistemology but has at the same time given us a pluralistic realism which goes beyond modern realism in so far as it, instead of confining itself to the doctrine of a plurality of determinate truths, indicates that reality is determinate admitting of an infinity of alternative predications, and that quite on an independent line of thought, scarcely inferior in scientific manipulation and pro-

‡ *Cf.* Lokaprakāsa, VI, pp. 31 ff.

fundity of conceptions to the present-day Humanism of the Western world. And it would be the height of sacrilege to the system of Jaina speculation to attempt an unnecessary twisting of facts, to impose an absolutist and monist interpretation on their conception of truth and reality, as has been done in some quarters, on the plea of pseudo-simplicity, or perhaps owing to speculative bias.§

§ *Vide* Prof. Radhakrishnan's "Indian Philosophy", ch. on the Jaina System.

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

The six orthodox systems of Indian Philosophy may be said to represent not so many unconnected dilettantish attempts but rather graded ascents of human thought towards the understanding and interpretation of the world-system with its graded truths and realities. They are indeed all traceable to the Upaniṣad-literature—a unique co-operative record of the sincerest thinkings and imaginings of the earliest and yet the most highly speculative minds of the world—and teach in a more systematic and co-ordinated form the problems of knowing and being in an ascending order of generality and abstractness than the Upaniṣads on which they draw. They may thus be said to form a hierarchy of truths, their final goal being to establish the unity of the forms of knowing and being in one spiritual reality. The battle of philosophies in all ages has been waged on the question of the One and the Many; the Universal and the Particular, and their inter-relation as the intellectual belligerents have put a premium on the One or the Many, on the Universal or the Particular, in their mutual exclusiveness; but the peculiarity of the Indian savants of old has been that they were abhorrent of militancy in the realm of thought, no less than their secular brethren in the physical realm. Peace and not war, unity and not absolute diversity is the innate law of the world of thought or spirit, war ceases to make its ravages in proportion as thought or spirit idealises the world of matter. The pyramid of knowing and being rises from the broad base of the Realistic Atomism of the Nyāya—Vaiśeṣika level of thought through the thinner psychological atmosphere of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga system, up to the highest pinnacle of speculative

thought of the Vedānta in which all grades of being and forms of knowing are co-ordinated and sublimated into an Ideal Reality which is the very postulate of all that is and is known.

Oriented from this synthetic point of view the Vaiśeṣika Atomistic Realism marks but the very natural attitude of the human mind in its quest of truth in which it is initially presented with an infinity of crude material contents of the real universe, exposed to its sense-observation, each entity absolutely excluding the other.[1] It is natural, therefore, that the most obtrusive of concepts before it, will be that of 'Viśeṣa' or 'particularity' which is the principle of individuation and distinction between one entity and another. In its analysis of the contents of the physical world it is thoroughly naturalistic and scientific, and it is difficult to withhold from Kaṇāda the credit which we lavish upon Dalton, Lord Kelvin or Faraday of the *modern* scientific world. If we want to find scientific thought realised in Ancient Indian Philosophy we may state that the Vaiśeṣika system answers to that aspiration.

The Nyāya system which goes along with the Vaiśeṣika has much in common with the latter except that the Nyāya system instead of conceiving the universe piece-meal, or in its infinite divisibility, regards it *en bloc*, and that it bestows more of its energies on the nature, conditions and validity of ratiocinative or inferential knowledge. Hence the system is termed Nyāya, from the term, Nyāya, Ānvikshiki or Tarka, or Ratiocination which is its dominant interest; though of course metaphysical discussions of the categories and of the right knowledge thereof as leading to salvation find due

1. For reasons for the logical priority of the Vaiśeṣika to the Nyāya see Prof. Radhakrishnan's Indian Philosophy Vol. II P. 31-32 foot-note.

place in it. Both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems accept the Causal Principle of *Ārambha-vāda* which makes the effect to be an emergent out of the qualities of the cause. The effect thus was non-existent before the operation of the cause, a new situation always resulting from its efficiency. The pot as such is an emergent out of the material and efficient causes operating in the shape of the constituent matter and the force of muscles and tendons of the potter respectively. Likewise the whole universe has been the emergent result of the material causes of the elements wrought upon by an efficient cause. In the cosmic production God as Efficient Cause is admitted in both Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya, with this difference that the Nyāya makes God an intelligent principle and thus explains the evolution of the universe in terms of external teleology, while Vaiśeṣika makes only an indirect reference to Him.

The Indian mind takes a decidedly advanced step towards speculative philosophy in the system of Sāṁkhya. Here it is no longer confined to the world of nature but shifts the centre of gravity of thought from the objective to the subjective. It points out more effectively that the world of nature is to be studied not so much for its own sake as for the sake of the soul which is more important in the scale of existence, and which therefore requires to be raised from its contamination by the natural world or Prakṛti and restored to its pristine purity of self-conscious existence which is its own essence. The soul of Sāṁkhya, though multitudinous, is endowed with consciousness unlike the soul of Nyāya and the Sāṁkhya philosopher is more deeply analytical in his empirical psychology of the Jivātman or the Puruṣa influenced by Prikṛti. It would not thus be going far from the truth to say that the Sāṁkhya-Yoga type of thought represents the psychological development in the history of Indian thought. It is psychological more eminently than metaphysical, or rather it is psychological in order to prepare

the mind to be competent for the metaphysical stratum of thought. It is not unmetaphysical but its dominant interest is psychological. It has a dualistic metaphysics in so far as the reality of Prakṛti or Primordial Matter over against the multitude of Puruṣas is clearly admitted; and to it the world of nature is the unconscious evolution out of that primordial reality under an unaccountable spiritual influence, for the Puruṣa which by nature is *nirlipta* or attributeless. The Jibātman or the psychological individual is the materialised soul and is the subject matter of empirical psychology which analyses its *virittis* or states of consciousness, intellectual, affective and volitional. If each soul is unique and different from its neighbour, the world of nature certainly bears a subjective complexion resulting from the operation of *ahaṃkāra* the principle of self-consciousness, but the world appears the same to the different selves owing to the operation of *buddhi* or cosmic intelligence which gives a trans-subjective existence to it. The Sāṁkhya principle of causation which governs all originations and reabsorptions is known as *Satkāryavāda* or the principle of transformation or conservation of energy, the effect being but the cause revealed and the cause the effect concealed. The effect is not a new creation but only transformation of one and the same physical energy which underlies all, and the entire evolution of the cosmos ensues with a view to the restoring of the self to its originally pure existence which it attains as an effect of the realisation of the distinction between the self and its other. Thus in the Sāṁkhya level of thought the Indian mind seems to emerge from the popular and objective view of things into the scientific conception of the psychical life and of the external world.

But speculative philosophy cannot rest satisfied with anything short of a deeper metaphysical basis bulwarked by

monistic logic; the speculative necessity of monistic interpretation of the ultimate reality is realised in the Vedāntic system of thought, either in the type of abstract monism of Saṁkara or of qualified monism of Rāmānuja, which are its two important varieties.

The pluralistic conception of the self of the Sāṁkhya really contains within it the germ of spiritualistic monism which is embedded in its principle of consciousness as such and even the Prakṛti of Sāṁkhya melts into being a virtually conscious principle in that it is the Buddhi or Cosmic intelligence which is the determinant of the existence of Prakṛti for the self. It is this idealistic conception of the self and Prakriti as a speculative necessity, leads logically to Vedāntic monism which represents the height of Indian speculative thought. Psychology no doubt is at the root of all enquiry in the sense that all our knowledge is in terms of consciousness, yet speculative thought is bound to fill in what is wanting in a mere empirical consciousness and thus to push all enquiry back to a basic spiritual principle. This is true of all idealistic philosophy which means but psychologism substantialised; and when this position is realised, the different contents of knowledge which empirically originate are found to occupy sub-ordinate, but graded levels within this foundational conscicusness. Now the derivative contents of the foundational consciousness have been conceived in the Vedānta Philosophy in either of two ways: one way is that the subordinate mental contents which arise and vanish belong to the surface of mental life and therefore do not affect its deeper undercurrent; the other way is that these diverse mental contents instead of being regarded as altogether meaningless, have been given relative or graded meaning, so that they have given rise to the three distinct strata of existence answering to the three distinguishable grades of truth, namely *Prātivāsika* or

momentary, *Vyāvahārika* or empirical and *Pāramārthika* or transcendental; and that each lower stratum is sublated by the next higher and the highest level of existence is identical with highest knowledge which is intutive cr alogical consciousness. This principle of gradual sublation of the lower stage of existence by the higher illustrating relativity of all knowledge may be said to be the philosophic account of the principle of *Māyā*. When the Vedāntin speaks of Māyā as Anirvāchya, what he means is simply this that a thing is cognised as real but may be regarded as also unreal in the sense that it is cognised from a different standpoint. What appears real from one standpoint may be regarded as unreal from another and higher standpoint. This relativity of knowledge and existence is quite in keeping with the Vedantic doctrine of causality known as *Vivartavāda* according to which there is no real origination of a new effect as in the *Ārambhavāda*, but rather the so-called effect is the *Vivarta* or illusory interpretation of the reality which remains unchanged, so that the effect is the cause misinterpreted. The *Vivartavāda* of pure monistic Vedānta is more allied to *Satkāryavāda* of Sāṁkhya in so far as there is identity between the cause and the effect, but is yet different from *Satkāryvāda* in that the effect in the latter is as real as the cause or the effect is the cause transfigured, while in the former the effect is the unreal subjective superimposition or *Adhyāsa* of qualities which have nothing to do with the cause. Thus the entire empirical scheme which is the network of cause and effect is the *Vivarta* or illusory projection upon the substratum of Brahman or the ultimate reality. Whatever is and is known, is Brahman, and all the diversities of things and minds of the empirical world are but modifications illusorily superimposed upon Brahman from our narrow and limited point of view which our limited

knowledge compels us to take, but *sub specie eternitatis* all such diversities are meaningless or unreal. But here the exponent of the qualified monistic Vedānta contends that *Vivartavāda* belies experience and reason, which reveal the system of existence to be a concrete reality of which God is the informing soul (*antarjāmin*), with the world of things and minds as evolved from and manifesting his nature. Your individual self or mine, this object and that, are not the inexplicable and unreal modes of Brahman, but are evolved or transformed out of the very being of God (*pariṇamavāda*) to form *real* parts of his body (Śarira), as the organs form the organism.

The pure idealist, however, urge that to claim knowledge and explanation of the nature and activity of the ultimate reality, as the qualified monistic Vedānta does, is simply to anthropomorphise a Being which is beyond all discursive explanation, but which, by its self-imposed limitations *or upādhis*, only lends itself in a sportive way to rational explanation, applicable only to the diverse and the determinate, but not to undifferenced uniety which is the true nature of Brahman.

When we return to the religion of the pure monistic Vedānta from its speculative height we find that though the metaphysic of the Vedānta absolutism does not accomodate a personal God, who, endowed as he is with personal qualities, creates, sustains and morally governs the universe yet it has made concessions to popular minds by relegating God to a lower level of existence taking him to be a creature of Māyā, and to belong to the Vyāvahārika or practical level of existence, where the conception of a personal God with qualities answering to emotions and aspirations of empirical conscious centres, has meaning and value. Ethically Vedānta is pre-eminently the philosophy of self-realisation and of self-culture. It is more truly an art of life than any other system of thought either in the East or in the West. Though Vedānta

is an apotheosis of knowledge and therefore naturally it insists on the perfection of a contemplative life as the stoics would have us do, yet it would be sacrilege to Vedānta philosophy to deny any place to the life of practice or service in its scheme. Resignation may be the ultimate goal of the Vedāntic realisation but it is not blind to the necessity of a life of activity even in the case of the Jivanmukta for whom activity has meaning and value as promoting not personal but social good.

As in the West even so in the East idealistic philosophy has had its necessary reaction. The idealism of Hegel with its slow but significant modifications in the Neo-Hegelian School has its reaction in scientific, realistic and pluralistic philosophies. In like manner India has seen a stout reaction against its orthodox systems in the philosophy of Jainism and Buddhism which represent the other side of the shield. For when metaphysical subtleties have attained the highest acme, a philosophy is bound to be confined to the select and the few, and fails to create satisfaction in the minds of the laity which moves in a lower groove of thought and can understand and lay to heart all that they find in their everyday experience and common sense. The systems of Jainism and Buddhism thus break allegiance to the Vedic tradition and have therefore been branded as heterodox systems. They are thus the voices of protest against Brahmanical aristocracy of intellect, calling the minds of the unsophisticated back to what is true and tangible from the experience and common sense point of view, in the same way as modern scientific and realistic philosophy of England and America is busy storming the stronghold of traditional idealism. A student of the history of Indian thought will be interested to observe that Jainism by its realistic pluralism marks the transition between the absolute monism of the Vedānta and phenomenalistic-

pluralism of Buddhism.

The Jaina Philosophy, as pluralistic realism admits the reality of the world of objects and of souls and of time and space which are all self-existent. The reality or *Dravya*, to the Jaina, is a concrete existence having permanence in the midst of changes.[1] A thing under-goes changes in so far as there arise new qualities ousting the old. but at the same time its identity is retained in the midst of its changing qualities. This conception of reality combines within itself the extremes of the Vedāntist conception of the absolute unchangeable reality and of the Bauddha conception of impermanence or perpetual flux, but is more than and different from each of them and therefore free from abstractionism with which each is vitiated. It is a concrete reality free at once from the abstractionism of the Vedānta on the one side which identifies reality with absolute permanence (Sattā) and on the other, from the opposite abstractionism of Buddhism, which reduces everything to pure and unmitigated change. The reality is not to be conceived exclusively in terms of *Sāmānya* or the Universal on the one side, or in terms of *Viśeṣa* or the Particular on the other, but rather in terms of the Universal as realised in the particular, or to put it in Aristotelian terminology, the Universal is not *ante res* nor *post res*, but *in rebus*. The spiritual as well as the physical reality is to be conceived in the same way. The conscious reality of the soul realises itself in the midst of its changing qualities and functions. The soul according to the Jaina is thus though permanent or *Nitya*, is yet *Pariṇāmi* or changeful unlike the Vedāntist and Sāmkhya soul which is *Apariṇāmi Nitya* or a really immutable existent, and unlike the Buddhist soul which is a mere *Pariṇāma* or an ever flowing stream of conscious changes

1. *Utpādabyayadhraubyavuktam sat.*— Tattwārthādhigama Sūtra Ch. V. 29.

(*Jñāna santāna*), their *Ālaya vijñāna* or the supposed back-ground of the *Jñāna santāna* being but an analogue of Mill's back-ground of conscious life in his psychological Atomism. But the most interesting of its tenets is the *Anekāntavāda*, more popularly known as *Syādvāda*, or the doctrine of Universal Probablism. The Jaina is committed to the belief that the reality is indeterminate, having an infinite number of aspects. It may be called existent from one point of view, but may also be called non-existant from another. Combining these two standpoints in succession we can call it existent and non-existent; again taking simultaneously these two aspects we make the thing indefinable (*Avyakta.*) By permutation and combination of these concepts the Jaina arrives at the famous seven-fold scheme of predication.[1] Applying this seven-fold scheme of predication to every unit of knowledge the Jaina has come to maintain that any one judgement from any one point of view, where there are really an infinite number of standpoints corresponding to an infinite number of aspects of the concrete reality, can represent but a relative truth. To express the Jaina conception of truth in the language of Perry, "The world may be truly conceived as permanent and unified since it is such *in a certain sense.* But this should not lead us, as it has led some intellectualists, to suppose that the world is therefore not changing and plural. We must not identify our world with one conception of it. In its concrete richness it lends itself to many conceptions and the same is true of the least thing of the world. It has many aspects none of which is exhaustive of it. It may be taken in many relations or orders and

1. This seven-fold scheme of the Jaina popularly known as *Saptabhanginaya* is unique in the history of Dialectic, though traceable in its inception to the Buddhist Jātakas where we have the famous dialogue of the Eel-wriggler.

be given different names accordingly.[1]"

The philosophy of experience and common sense which found expression through Jaina thought received only half success, the other half being left to be achieved by the phenomenalistic pluralism of the Buddha. He has shown more effectively than any of his predecessors that the pragmatic value of a philosophy is far more to be prized than mere intelluctual felicity. A philosophy which does not originate in the very pulsation of life and exprience and does not therefore add moral value to them, may satisfy the curious but never the common herd of men who hungers and thirsts after moral satisfaction in their ordinary daily life. So the Buddha brings down, like Prometheus, from the sidereal height the glow of the life of service to enlighten and envigorate the popular mind. In Buddhism we have the highest development of human thought in the line of experience with all its richness of pragmatism, empiricism, subjective idealism, individualism, relieved by its religion of service to humanity. Jainism, marking, as it does, atheistic attitude so far as it denies any creative God, simply signalises the reaction against orthodox theistic philosophy, and insists that the highest religion consists in the attainment by man of the intellectual, emotive and meral powers in their superlative degree, and thus becomes individualistic in its conception of liberation; whereas Buddhism points out the futility of personal salvation and insists on lifting or ameliorating the human species from degeneration and despair by promulgating the virtues of service, charity and good will to all. Thus Buddhism, as it thins down the compact metaphysical thought of the orthodox schools of Indian philosophy on the one side, compensates its scepticism and nihilism by giving us perhaps the most elevating code of moral life which is but another name for religion of humanity.

1. *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, P. 228.

THE ETHICAL BASIS OF PHILOSOPHY.

What is or should be, the proper starting point of philosophy is a question as important and all-engrossing as the correct conception of philosophy itself. If philosophy is to mean a consistent account of the life and universe as a whole in all its phases, relations and inter-relations, a philosophical enquiry may take its rise in any one of the multifarious interests which may possibly engage the mind of the enquirer into the riddles of the universe. Again these interests may vary according to environmental diversities, as much as to the imagination of the thinker. Hence it is that in the cosmosophical interest of the average Greek mind we find that philosophy starts with an enquiry into the wondrous working of the elemental nature. Thus philosophy with Plato begins with curiosity, with the inquisitive tendency of the mind to unravel the enigmas of external nature. Such a curiosity can so long furnish a starting point of philosophy as the mind is lost in admiration of the objective world without being concious of its own self-sufficiency as a conscious interpreter of it. But as soon as it has out-grown its childlike bewilderment in the midst of overwhelming influences of the world of nature, and has come to its self-conscious independence and mastery over nature, it begins to doubt and disbelieve all that comes to it from the external source. Hence we find that modern philosophy takes its start from doubt. And this principle of doubt again assumes either of the two forms: Sometimes it takes the form of disbelieving everything except whatever comes by way of positive experience and discarding everything that is thrust upon the mind by any extraneous authority; at other times, this principle of doubt adopts a method of more radical sifting of all evidence coming either from objective nature or from subjective experience until it has come upon a principle of certitude which by its

self-evidence may form the indubitable type of all knowing and being. This principle is, as known to all students of philosophy, the principle of self-consciousness and that all modern idealistic philosophy is founded on the bedrock of this principle of self-consciousness.

In both the above accounts of the origin of philosophical enquiry we find that it is the intellectual satisfaction that is the moving power which sets the mind to philosophise, be it of the form of crude impulse of curiosity or of the methodical doubting by way of reaching the indubitable in our quest of truth. Another current of thought which stimulates thinking in modern times, is the pragmatic interest which studies and evaluates nothing for its own sake but everything as a source of fruitful activity. It tells us that we must know things as true only because they serve us some practical purpose. This pragmatic attitude again has developed into a wider interest by rising to be humanistic in that it has no longer to be satisfied with the position that a thing is true and and idea or a judgment correct only because it leads to a successful fruition, but because it has a wider outlook that it satisfies our needs as human beings. Thus humanistic outlook is only a widened pragmatism, including as it does the whole problem of human interest, and making philosophy to take its rise in the consideration of the practical and useful consequences leading to a satisfaction of human needs whether ethical, æsthetic, metaphysical or theological. A history of thought not unfrequently bears witness either to curiosity, doubt or practical consequences as the alternate sources of philosophical inquiry. But are these the only motive forces that stimulate human mind to inquire into the universe of which man finds himself a miserably handicapped member? The universe with all its complexity and its unfathomable mysteries, with

all its multifarious relations into which he is hopelessly entangled, darkening and encrusting his spiritual life under an overgrowth of passions and desires which are not really its own, presents to him a picture of veritable prison-house from which he ever makes an endeavour to escape. And actuated by such a frantic desire of escape he seeks out the light which would illumine his way thereto. To gain back the original purity and freedom from all excrescences of misery, evil and pain the human soul cries out in distress and perhaps with a note of warning to all who are in the same plight, "Know thyself." Have a knowledge of your own self in its purity, in its freedom from all accretions of the non-soul and you are saved. Thus philosophy begins with an ethical evaluation of the self by discriminating the self from the contaminating not-self. Elaborate consideration of the elements, foreign to and therefore contaminating the soul and of the ways and means whereby to expurgate the soul from such retarding elements, is found in the philosophies of both Europe and India, beginning from Socrates through the Stoics down to Spinoza, Kant, Fichte and Schopenhauer in Europe and in India from the entire teachings of the *Upaniṣads*, down to the *Nyāya* system to a certain extent and the Sāṁkhya and Vedānta systems in particular. For a careful student of the history of Indian and European thought citations corroborative of what is pointed out here would certainly sound superfluous. But as an indication of what we mean, reference to some of the leading philosophers subscribing to this view-point may not be out of place. Spinoza in his *Ethica* P. V, Prop. II, observes: "If we remove a disturbance of the spirit or emotion from the thought of an external cause and unite it to other thoughts then will the love or hatred towards that external cause and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from these emotions, be destroyed."

To Spinoza it is the bondage of the self to passions and emotions arising from the sensuous life that set the thinking mind to enquire into the nature of that bondage, and the life of intuition which can break through that life of bondage. To Kant philosophy in its positive aspects may rightly be asserted to have arisen out of his view of the moral will which is free from the excrescences or retarding contents of the life of sensibility, though he paves the way for this standpoint of his by his negative and destructive criticism of speculative reason. And Fichte, his logical follower, carried to the farthest consequences the ethical basis of philosophy by an apotheosis of the transcendental Ego as the moral order of the universe; while ethical philosophy is established to be the right sort of philosophy by Schopenhauer. He posits that the ultimate reality is Will and the human will which is more or less contaminated by *ratio* or reason is proportionately miserable and the human effort must be directed to the elimination of reason from the will and philosophy has its main spring in that effort of derationalising human will.

When we look to the systems of Indian philosophy we find that all of them have, in varying degrees, a reference to the ethical interest which has prompted the Indian thinkers to formulate a view of life and the universe. Even the system of *Chārvāka*, the reputed heterodox system of thought, which has a diametrically opposite view of morality and religion to those of the orthodox systems, has also its rise in a view of life which though not appealing to the idealist school, yet after all is the moral consideration of how a life should be lived with the maximum satisfaction of the sensuous. It is a philosophy not of non-moral or amoral origin but traceable to hedonistic morality. Philosophy in India is pre-eminently an art of life rather than a theory of the universe. It is primarily interested in laying down

the ways and means to the attainment of a beatific existence, free at once from ignorance and the consequent appendages that deprive the self-translucent ego of the clear vision which is its natural possession, an analysis, description, comparison and other intellectual modes of survey of the contents of the objective world in so far as they have any bearing on and therefore influence over the spiritual self, having only a secondary interest in it. It is the attainment of the *Nihśreyasa* or the *summum bonum* by way of the destruction of the triple misery that forms the very burden of all the Indian systems. Nowhere else than in India has been the practical aspect of philosophy more adequately recognised; philosophy in india is a discipline that we are to live up to, rather than a mere intellectual satisfaction of the curious. To refer to a few masters of Indian philosophy out of many, Gautama starts his system of Nyāya philosophy with stating that we must thoroughly discuss the categories as preliminary to the attainment of *Nihśreyasa* (*Nyāya Sutras*, Chapter I). Īswara Krishṇa introduces his system in the same strain when he states that since every individual is found stricken with threefold misery there arises the necessity of enquiry into the means of destruction thereof, and clearly elucidates how the soul attains the *summum bonum, viz.*, its original purity which is absolute freedom from its contamination with the cosmic principle, by his famous illustration of the dancing girl retiring from the stage at the conclusion of a dramatic performance before an audience whose minds have seen through, and therefore have been satiated in their fascination for and therefore become indifferent to her. From this it is apparent that in *Sāṁkhya* too a speculative philosophy has secondary importance in so far as it helps the individual self to regain its original freedom by knowing the world and its content for what it is worth. Here also we

have the Socratic view of philosophy that 'knowledge is virtue', that knowledge is not for its own sake but for the sake of attaining a virtuous life. The Vedānta system in its variety of phases may best be described as a philosophy of self—culture and self-realisation. *Moksha* or liberation, whose positive side is the intuitive grasp of the unity between the finite and the infinite consciousness, has its negative side in a gradual falling off of the influence of *Karmai.* Thus the doctrine of *Karma* which is one of the main points of community amongst all the Indian systems, receives a searching and comprehensive consideration from the writers of the Vedānta, whether as a disciplinary precondition preparing the mind for the heights of Vedantic thought or as the routine of life to be followed by an inquirer into *Brahman* and as resulting in or conducive to the attainment of *Jeevanmukti, Videhamukti or Karmamukti.*

The Bauddha and the Jaina systems are ethical in their origin and culmination perhaps more than any other Indian systems. They may be described as the ethico-pluralistic reactions against the orthodox semi-ethical Brahmanical systems which are more or less entangled in metaphysical subtleties to the extent of suffocating men's minds in their thin atmosphere of absolutism. And hence Buddhism turning them away from lucubrations about the unseen to what is seen, from the giddy height of metaphysics to the more tangible world of experience, by pointing out that we are but the results of an ever-continuing potency of *Samskāra, of Avidyā and Vāsanā* which keep the cycle of birth and death going on and that *Nirvāṇa* or cessation of this cycle of birth and death may be attained by the destruction of this potency of *Samskāra* to be effected by following the eightfold path of life and conduct laid down by the Buddha, the main spirit of whose teaching is disinterested service and

love to humanity. Buddhism is a system of ethics before being a system of speculative philosophy in any sense of it.

Jainism too, like Buddhism, is more practical than speculative in its interest. But unlike Buddhism which is anti-metaphysical Jainism has given place to the problems of metaphysics as necessary part of itself—a fact which is accountable perhaps by its being a link between the metaphysics of the Upanishads and ethical phenomenalism of Buddhistic thought,—but the fact remains that the goal of Jainism is the attainment of Jinahood or that level of existence which is even higher than and beyond that of the gods, not by theoretical knowledge or even by a life of intuition, but by following a course of moral discipline laid down in the system. The *Jina* or the Conqueror and the *Ārhata* or the Deserving is not any superhuman being but a mortal among mortals exalted into an all-perfect being with the superlative of conative, emotive and intellectual powers. The importance of self-discipline has been emphasised by the Jaina thinkers to indicate that Godhead is not a thing of the other world, but lies within human powers and is attainable by a course of rigorous drill of the moral potentialities of man. In Jainism *Karma* has been given a more metaphysical complexion than in the orthodox schools or in Buddhism. In fact it is with the Jaina a material principle which clings to the *Jeeva* or the individual soul in various degrees of ~~force, and~~ retards in proportion his advance towards Jinahood, in much the same way as the *materia prima* of Leibnitz clouds and confuses the representation of the *monads* or potential soul-units; and the materialised soul as the result of influx of *Karma* (*āsrava*) gradually rises into being a free (*mukta*) personality by the process of *Saṁvara* (stoppage of karmic influx) and *nirjara* (annihilation of karmic matter attaching to the soul) and thus gains back its original purity and clearness which is

Jinahood.

A careful orientation of the urges of philosophic inquiry emerging in different times and climes and under diverse influences as briefly outlined above, may at least suggest that the philosophic inquisitiveness though taking its rise in some cases in wonder or curiosity and in others in the critical spirit of doubt as to unsifted materials of knowledge, either thrust upon the mind by authority or poured into it from external experience, has a deeper fountainhead imbedded in the moral nature of man. Just as it is an undeniable epistemological fact that all knowledge is self-knowledge, even so the objective of all knowledge, and philosophy may be said to be self-amelioration. In this sense therefore knowledge for its own sake apart from all reference to its ultimate purpose of self-amelioration has no real significance for a selfconscious soul. A child is curious and loses itself in admiration and wonder as to whatever presents itself to its mind in the first instance, but its mind is not yet self-conscious. A young man may doubt and disbelieve things because he has learnt to be critical by his experience of being frustrated very often by hard facts of reality. This curiosity or intellectual rebuff may have their occasion to arise so long as the mind of man has not transcended either childlike admiration or youthful overcautiousness. But as soon as there begins a crystallisation of the fluids of exuberent thoughts, an introspective self-examination makes its appearance in the psychical life of man and the result is a complete veering round of the flow of conscious life from the objective to the subjective, from mere intellectual satisfaction to conative realisation. The same remarks hold good of the conscious life in general and not simply of an individual mental life. Just as with the development of individual consciousness from boyhood to age there is a steady advancement from a mere outward or objective thinking to a

thinking of things nearer home, even so the race-mind begins with the outward and culminates in the inward ways of thinking of its more vital problems. In this sense therefore there is some truth in saying that Indian philosophy in general occupies the highest point on the scale of maturescence in that its general trend of inquiry, as already pointed out, is characterised by an evaluation of the self as it is and as it should be. It is interesting to note that in the light of the above suggestion the Comtean gradation of knowledge from *theology* which assigns every phenomenon to divine personality, through *metaphysics* where mind deals with abstract powers, to *positive science* which accepts neither personal powers nor metaphysical abstractions but only whatever is revealed through sense-experience and generalisations therefrom, is a *reductioad absurdum* of what we have tried to emphasise. Philosophy if it be not reduced to phenomenology but allowed to retain its transcendental character, a *met*-emperic illumination of the world of becoming, it cannot be lost in its mere analysis of the latter and must have a mooring in the realm of spiritual reality which is essentially a moral dynamic. A scientific consideration of facts, "scientific method in philosophy," or "logical atomism" to which all so-called scientific philosophy is attempted to be reduced, may at best be a means and cannot be an end of all philosophical inquiry which has its rise, to repeat our point of view, only in the need of ameliorating or betterment of man's spiritual existence.

Again, if philosophy has its rise in the ethical evaluation of the self, we cannot pass over in this connection the question of values and its bearing on the nature of philosophy itself. The question of values, specially of moral values, is one of the principal determinants of the currents of modern philosophy. The Indian conception of the origin of philosophy, no less than that of Spinoza, Kant or Schopenhauer in Europe, is an anticipation of the present-day doctrine of values, which seems ultimately to cover and interpret all possible problems of

philosophy in terms of good and bad; and one can predict with no little confidence that all future philosophy will be the philosophy of values. Now if that be so and if it is also true to say that all values after all relate to the self, individual and universal, that is, have meaning and importance only in relation to the self which evaluates things by reference to itself, our proposition that an articulate philosophy has its source more properly in moral evalution than in mere intellectual curiosity, or suspension of judgment or in dry and abstract logicism, stands the test of time and reason; and we venture to declare it against Russell's position that "the philosophy therefore, which is to be genuinely inspired by the scientific spirit, must deal with somewhat dry and abstract matters, and must not hope to find an answer to the practical problems of life"—(Russell's *Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. 40). The present-day philosophy of values certainly brings out more explicitly what was lying implicit in all philosophical inquiry; and in view of this we may observe that the philosophy of values is but "a new name for some old ways of thinking." Its special importance consists in indicating that the ethical values are not simply the inspiration of philosophy but also the crowning of it. They are not merely the evolutes of human mind out of all touch with the real order of things, but they are also in the very constitution of them. The distinction between what is factual and what is ideal can never be an absolute one. The relation between the factual and the ideal is grossly misconceived if the problems of life and the universe are considered apart from values and if the values are left over as something consequential; but the real situation seems to be that "moral experience and the moral order of which we are conscious, are part of the material which we have to take into account before we have a right to accept any philosophical theory or to adopt it as an adequate point of view for the interpretation of reality as a whole."[1]

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1. Dr. Sorley's *Moral Values and the Idea of God.* P. 501.

MIND IN EMERGENT EVOLUTION.

The influence of the concept of Evolution on modern thought since Darwin cannot be overrated and has been controlling it almost with a magical charm for the simple reason that the last two generations of mankind are claiming to be more versed in 'Science' than in 'Philosophy.' Professor Dewey's monograph on 'The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy' (1910) among other things laid the foundations of a naturalistic theory of man, reducing all human activities to be responses to stimuli; experience being defined as just certain modes of the interaction of natural objects, of which the physical body is one, states of consciousness being replaced by 'sensori-motor co-ordinations of functions and habits, of adjustments and re-adjustments between the human animal and its environment.'[1] But it is interesting to note that the immediate effect of Darwinism on Philosophy, and its subsequent development into Behaviourism in psychology, Instrumentalism, Naturalism and Realism in philosophy only tended to make philosophical outlook more naturalistic than evolutionary. "The conceptual apparatus of Darwin's theory of Evolution—accidental variations, struggle for existence, survival of the fittest, etc., has now been dropped, nor have post-Darwinian developments in biology, (e. g., the theories of Mendel and Weismann, with all the detailed researches to which they have led or the rise of neo Lamarckianism) exercised any marked influence on our evolutionary naturalists in philosophy."[2] Again the biological concepts of evolution being confined to the phenomena of life alone, the need of a more generalised formula was felt and found its response in

1. English & American Philosophy Since 1800. P. 396.

2. Philosophy To-day p. 1-2.

the wider Cosmic Evolution of Spencer who showed that biological evolution was only one chapter in the whole story. Darwin was a biologist whereas Spencer was a philosopher and evolutionary philosophy owes much more to Spencer than to Darwin. And the combined effort of both Darwin and Spencer has been to transfigure the old Atomic materialism in what we know call Modern Materialism or Naturalism whose aim is to construe everything and every phenomenon physical or mental in terms of natural laws. But the present day evolutionists, however are loath to accept the grandiosely futile formula of Spencer which involves many a lacuna or gap in its application to the Cosmic System as a whole and have hit upon the concepts, of 'Emergence' and 'Emergent Evolution'[1] which exercise almost a magical charm with them. They are now thinking that Emergent Evolution gives us the most thorough-going history of the sequence of stages through which what Lloyd Morgan calls the "increasing richness in stuff and substance," of the universe has been attained; but so many thinkers of different schools are now converging towards the one common movement of modern thought of which 'Emergence' is the watchword, that it is not easy to give a simple statement of Emergent Evolution. It counts within its camp neo-realists, critical realists, biologists and even organicists, and no two of its exponents agree in respect of very fundamental points. Lloyd Morgan's Scheme for instance, seems to give a *finished* pyramid of matter-life-mind, while Alexander provides ample scope for progression from space-time to God and perhaps beyond God, for his universe is still evolving, and the present is ever big with prospective novelties about to emerge. Sellars' interest seems to lie in his attempt to establish a thorough-going naturalistic theory of mind, though however

1. Philosophy to-day p. 2.

he never comes in close quarters with the alleged processes of emergence of life and mind. Again Professor Strong's version differs from Lloyd Morgan's in that while the latter postulates that the physical which is real, has a psychical correlate, the former starts with an assumption that the real nature of the physical is psychical. And Noble makes a noble venture to equate organic with inorganic causation, reducing teleology to be merely an abstract aspect of mechanistic results of greater stability, and thus unconsciously rehabilitates Spencerian Scheme over which the doctrine of Emergent Evolution in any form claims superiority. And as Lloyd Morgan postulates Divine purpose to be the guiding principle of evolution, so Noble accepts his mutilated teleology throughout nature, and curiously enough, he ignores more completely than Lloyd Morgan, the grades of experience which would have convinced anybody else of what teleology proper implies, while Wheeler with his biological predilections make emergence to consist in "*a novelty of behaviour*" arising from the specific interaction or organization of a number of elements, inorganic, organic or mental, which thereby constitute a whole, as distinguished from their mere sum or resultant.

Without further detailing the emergent formulas of minor importance we may farily be said to be in a position to evaluate the theory of Emergent Evolution as a cosmological hypothesis. The whole history of the theory shows that there has been going on a regular tug-of-war between the opposing tendencies of contemporary thought—the one scientific or naturalistic and the other metaphysical or philosophical. Professor Sellars may be said to have taken hold of the naturalistic end of the rope, the philosophical end being gripped by Lloyd Morgan. And of all the accounts of Emergent Evolution, that of Lloyd Morgan, purged of its inconsistencies

(and inconsistencies there are in all the accounts) is admittedly the most acceptable, elaborate and authoritative, as it originates with one who combines in him the qualities of a scientist, a psychologist and a philosopher. We would therefore propose to concentrate upon the account of Emergent Evolution as given by Morgan, not of course in all its implications, but only in so far as it relates to mind as it functions in the history of the cosmic process, it evolves its states and powers and determines the subsquent go of the process when it has once emerged, and would supplement our estimate of the problem of mind in Emergent Evolution by reference to the cognate views of the contemporary evolutionists.

"In the old sense," says Lloyd Morgan," evolution meant the unfolding of what is already in being, but enfolded. In that sense emergence is the coming into view of that which has hitherto been submerged—virtually there but hidden; latent and not as yet patent. Now-a-days the word "evolution" has supplanted the older word "epigenesis" and means the coming into existence of something in some sense *new;* and this something new, is what Lewes labelled "*emergent*," as contrasted with "resultant." The emergent, he claimed, is impredictable before its *de-facto* epigenesis; the resultant is calculable before the event, on line analogous to the so-called "Parallelogram of forces". In these terms emergent evolution is on the one hand through and through naturalistic; but on the other hand, it embodies a protest against a mechanical, or so called mechanistic, interpretation." Elsewhere he lays down, "Emergent Evolution urges that the "more" of any given stage, even the highest, involves the "less" of the stages which are precedent to it and continue to exist with it." It does not interpret the higher in terms of the lower only, for that would imply denial of the emergence of those new modes of natural relatedness which characterise the higher and

make it what it is. And it is too well known to repeat here the three-fold assumption or 'acknowledgement' he makes with what Alexander calls 'natural piety' as the necessary postulate of his philosophy of Evolution, for according to him all constructive philosophy must have its acknowledgements or postulates to start with. Morgan's story begins with a reality which is one, indivisibly one, a psychophysical whole from top to bottom, a matter—life—mind. While passing from matter to life and life to mind, we cross no gulf, but pass from one kind of acquaintanceship with this reality to the other. According to him there are no physical events, there are no integral systems of physical events that are not also psychical events, and integral psychical systems. "There is one evolution in both attributes—distinguishable but no wise separable." And the whole process is guided by a relating and directive activity which manifests itself in evolution "under the conditions of space and time."

It is needless here to point out that with Alexander mind emerges at a certain stage of purely physical complexity, out of the originally evolving stuff of space—time, "without anything of the psychical correlation postulated by Morgan. Now beginning from the starting point of his evolution one can see that there has been evolution by emergence in the physical realm which had some indefinite physical forerunner of matter distributed in systems of very simple organisation. The systems became more and more complex; protons and electrons combined themselves in varied systems, to give rise to the various chemical elements like oxygen, hydrogen, sulphur etc., and their resulting 'qualities' and 'properties' are emergents. Oxygen and hydrogen, combined in certain proportions, have rendered actual the potentialities of oxygen and hydrogen with the result that water has emerged exhibiting qualities and properties different from

hydrogen and oxygen in the pure state. The *new kind of relatedness* is intrinsic to the system; the emergence of the new qualities and properties is independent of any new extrinsic relation. Similarly for the emergence of all other chemical compounds. When further we come upto the level of life we find that life emerged when some system of atoms chiefly, C, H, O, N, perhaps with P and S, attained a new degree of complexity; and the complex qualities and properties of assimilation, metabolism, growth, generation, regeneration, and the rest also attended it. And finally the new complications of living system rendered the emergence of *sentience* or forerunner of mind possible; and with the further complications of sentience, cognition emerged and we have what is called mind, for the first time appearing on the scene. Then when those systems in which Mind has emerged, acquired greater and greater complexities, they exhibited higher forms of intellectual and moral qualities, and according to Alexander, the pre-eminent amongst these intellectual and moral systems will be the Deity who is yet to emerge.

The above in brief is the general story of the evolutionary process under the emergent scheme. The next question that naturally suggests itself is what is that condition, what is that 'critical' turning point in the advancing course of events that evokes emergence of new qualities and properties? Morgan's answer is that it is "the increasing complexity of stuff and richness in substance." He writes elsewhere, "Progressive advance in evolution is my theme." Now the whole question of emergent evolution hinges on what Morgan means by "Increasing compexity of stuff and richness in substance" and by "Progressive advance?" Does it consist in greater *complexity* or increased *efficiency*? Apparently he means by it greater complexity. Now 'greater complexity' or supervenience of new relatedness or increase in stuff and

substance or whatever term he might have used, it can at best stand for that idea of epigenesis, which emergent evolution is out to dispel.

Further if "greater complexity" be the criterion of evolution it does not apply to the changes in the physical and chemical world. Given pressure, temperature and the rest of the collocation of conditions there seems to be no good reason to suppose that mere cooling and condensation of the earth's crust could have given us the complexity in the physical and chemical realm that we now have. Again the term "greater complexity" is a misnomer as applied to physical or inorganic evolution. If we accept the findings of the best of physicists of the present day we cannot but be convinced that the whole trend of the cosmic process is towards dissolution, dissipation and even annihilation and not towards evolution, or at least it is a change, but mere change is not evolution. Or, to put it otherwise, the physical world thus illustrates *immergence* rather than emergence.

True evolution, then consists in the progressive organisation in respect of both *complexity* and *efficiency*, complexity being subordinated to efficiency. And mere increase of complexity of organization, not accompanied by increase of efficiency, is mere monstrosity, devolution rather than evolution. And the main point of difference between organic evolution and physico-chemical change is that while the former is a process of cumulative change, each organic type having an evolutionary history of its own which determines the increase in the structural complexity as the result of *memory*, the latter is without memory and therefore cannot be called evolution, the term memory being used in the widest possible sense to mean a *stability of organisation* which enables it to survive change and to incorporate effects of change within itself–a stability which is utterly wanting in the physical nature.

But the problem with which we are most directly concerned is the emergence of mind, and the first step in that process is the emergence of Sentience. Now we are told that sentience is purely anoetic, it is something in between mind and matter, without causal efficiency and therefore without any effect upon the chemical events of the brain from which it is alleged to have emerged. If so, then this emergence of Sentience contradicts the very principle of emergence which consists, we have seen, in the causal efficiency determining the subsequent go of the process, and as such simply rehabilitates Epiphenomenalism which it is the aim of emergent evolution to overcome. Again, the emergence of Sentience, the supposed first effulgence of mind, has never-been tackled in close quarters either by the neo-realists of the school of Alexander, by the critical realists of the school of Lloyd Morgan. Even granting the emergence of Sentience we are, however, still far from the emergence of mind which must furnish an account of the three aspects of cognition, feeling and conation.

We next proceed therefore to estimate the accounts given by the emergentists of these three aspects of the mind. Cognition implies an objective reference. Now with regard to reference Morgan has given two alternative accounts in two works. In his *Emergent Evolution* Morgan tells us that the first inkling of mind is a passive Sentience in which there is no effective relatedness or causal efficency, but which is accompanied by a vague enjoyment, but later on with the complication of Sentience by revivals of formerly experienced sense-qualities, reference or cognition emerges and conscious guidance of behaviour begins and repetition makes it more and more conscious. In his later work *Life, Mind and Spirit*, he however modifies his view of the–emergence of reference and says that what emerges is not reference as such, which is correlate with the physical, but a special kind of reference, called by him "*Prospective reference*" that introduces the conscious guidance of behaviour. But the crux

of the question is what makes the reference prospective? What makes the emergence of the appreciation of temporal relations involved in prospective reference? To this we do not get any satisfactory answer from Morgan. The attempt on the part of Morgan to account for the genesis of cognition by the conjunction of sense-qualities is the rehabilitation of the old associationist view of perception modified by the principle of emergence or creative synthesis. The fact of the matter is that "If we are not quite gratuitously to place an impassable gap between the earlier and the later stages of mental development, we must assume that reference or cognition cannot be legitimately regarded as evolved or as emergent, out of some events or some functions that have from the beginning nothing of the nature of cognition." Further all intelligent perception involves appreciation not only of spatial and temporal relations but also of causal relations. But even here in his explanation of the causal relations he repeats the old story and says that it is the complication of sentience by alleged revival of sense-qualities that constitutes the essence of the process.

When we turn to Morgan's disposal of the problem of *conation* or of *impulse*, we receive no better explanation than that it is purely a physical process, without reference whatsoever to what is called a *hormic* factor. But curiously enough he has nevertheless smuggled "planful activity" or "inner urge" into the process. What we expected from him is the account of the emergence of conation at a level of animal evolution, posterior to or higher than that of the emergence of reference, for reference is involved in conation. Without prior reference there is no impulse or conation and without conation or implulse no prospective reference either spatial or temporal. The fact of the matter is that Morgan's account is mechanistic, and no hormic or teleological event can

emerge from any combination of mechanistic events, just as no positive quantity can emerge from the summation of negative ones.

Not only the element of conation but also that of feeling, of which pleasure and pain are but the simple forms, receives no adequate explanation at his hands for their emergence. In "Creation by Evolution" he writes: "Enjoyment is concomitant with life, even so simple an animal as amoeba has something, however rudimentary of the nature of enjoyment," and adds that with the emergence of prospective reference there emerges also a foretaste in enjoyment". But as already intimated, we miss here any plausible explanation of the emergence of enjoyment, or differentiation of pleasure and pain from rudimentary enjoyment,—except a hedomistic account of behaviour that all our activities are influenced by pleasure and pain.

We cannot conclude our consideration of the mind in relation to emergent evolution without referring to the role of mind in the evolutionary process. What we have gathered so far, is that emergent scheme as applied to the physical realm, renders an account which amounts to—devolution annihilation or immergence, and as applied to the mental realm, it has revealed that it instead of explaining the evolution of mental capacities by way of the emergence of new relatedness causal or otherwise, it has indirectly corroborated the the supposition that mind everywhere at all levels is fundamentally teleological, cognitive, conative and affective, but differentiates its latent powers according to fundamental laws of its own that are teleological, and that there has been no emergence of the teleological from a mechanistic physical realm. Our next important query will, therefore, be, as was with Morgan: "What makes emergents emerge?" And this, it need hardly be told, is the fundamental question of the phi-

losophy of Evolution.

To this question at least three different answers could be given, and I have chosen three distinct types of thinkers as representing the three lines of approach. I mean Sellars, Alexander, and Lloyd Morgan. Sellars in his *Evolutionary Naturalism* has given the straight and consistent answer that the whole process is through and through physical, the so called psychical events being only the highly complicated physical events. Or to put it more definitely the psychical is an evolution from a purely physical and mechanical world that has nothing of the nature of mind, and the psychical; when it reaches the human level with the high complexity of human brain processes, it plays its part as concious thinking and conation in the total complex of psychophysical events. His scheme is conspicuous by the absence of the handling of many important problems like memory, heredity etc, nor does it really come in close quarters with the alleged processes of emergence of life and mind. Alexander's scheme, it is needless to repeat, begins with space—time as the matrix of all,—passes through life and mind which later is bound to develop into Deity. In it mind appears at a particular level, but thenceforward instead of exerting causally on the subsequent go of events remained as a mere onlooker compresent with the physical series. And the whole cosmogony of Alexander ignores the problem of the relation between teleology and mechanism which is the central problem for any scheme of emergent evolution that undertakes to account for the emergence of mind from the physical realm. But both Sellars and Alexander may be asked the question : Does not the logic underlying the principle of evolution urge us to seek for something antecedent to where their schemes start, some teleological principle of the nature of mind, which has not only given start to the

process in that line in which it continues, but also immanently works through it ? It is because of this logical necessity that Morgan has been led to think that the reality is one integral whole of the psychical and the physical combined, and the go of events is directed throughout by the transcendent activity of God. But at the same time we wonder how he could not shake off altogether his ultra-scientific bias when he is found not prepared to allow any extra-natural element in the evolutionary process. The main source of trouble both with philosophers and scientists seems to be that they begin by treating mind as a mere spectator of events and having done so it becomes difficult for them to give it the more important position it deserves.

THE LATE LORD HALDANE AND HIS PHILOSOPHY.

The death of Lord Haldane removes from the galaxy of British luminaries one of those who shed lustre at once on the judicial, political and philosophical horizon of Great Britain. An eminent lawyer able statesman and acute philosopher he was perhaps second to none in modern England, except perhaps Mr. Bertrand Russell whose many-sided activities and contributions have already created a land-mark in the history of European civilization and culture.

The talents and scholarship of the late Lord seem to have adopted two main channels of development, one political, determining his official life, and the other philosophical, informing his private life, thus creating a desirable equipoise between the inner and the outer, the contemplative and the secular, the idealistic and realistic aspects of life. And though it is not yet time to decide whether he was greater as a statesman than as a philosopher, or as a philosopher than as a statesman yet it is the conviction of many who have known the value of his philosophical contributions, that he would have been counted amongst the greatest of world's philosophers, had he devoted his intellect exclusively to philosophy. We shall however confine ourselves to a review of his philosophy only in outline.

In spite of his incidental confession, "I am not by profession a philosopher" and of his pressing political pre-occupation, his life-long philosophical activities indicate that he was not amongst those who become philosophers by accident. His whole university career, both in England and in Germany, was influenced by the eminent masters of philosophy who really shaped his inner life. "At 16 I went to Edinburgh

University in 1873", writes the late Lord, "and studied under the late professor Fraser. I obtained the Bruce of Grangehill Medal in Metaphysics and the Ferguson scholarship of the four Scottish Universities three years later. I went also to Gottingen and studied under Lotze. I was much influenced by Kant and specially by Hegel; by his method of approach rather than by his system, or by his detailed theory of the Absolute. On the whole, I think that Hegel has come nearer to the ultimately true view than any one since the ancient Greeks." (*Contemporary British Philosophy. First Series* p. 130.). Lord Haldane had thus a systematic training in philosophy, specially in Hegelian philosophy which has exercised a considerable influence on his view of life and the universe. He has therefore been counted as one of the prominent members of the Neo-Hegelian school started by the genius of J. H. Sterling, and continued and perfected by the eminent Hegelian interpreters, like Green, Caird brothers, Bradley, Bosanquet, Mc. Taggart, Mackenzie, Muirhead and others.

The Neo-Hegelian school to which the Late Viscount Haldane has attached himself, has a history behind it. The great Victorian age was labouring under the difficulty of reconciling science and religion, the discoveries of the secrets of nature made after patient research and the spiritual interests of humanity. The traditional philosophies of Great Britain, Empiricism and Intuitionism, represented respectively by Mill and Hamilton, inadequate in themselves, were wrangling over problems which had hardly any bearing on the view of life and the universe which would at once satisfy the demands both of science and religion. It was at this psychological moment that James Hutchison Sterling opened up before the thirsting mind of the British public, the flood-gates of scientific knowledge and spiritualism by his unsurpassed

exposition in his *Secret of Hegel* of the Hegelian system, which owing to the complexity of its thought and language had remained until that time a sealed book to them. Hegelian philosophy appealed most to the Victorian age because it substituted concrete thinking for the abstractions of the understanding. To separate things from each other, to suppose that each entity is real by itself and has no necessary connection with others in the inveterate habit of the unreflecting mind. Hegel carries his reader to a higher level of thought and shows that reality is ultimately a single coherent and all-inclusive system of which particular objects are merely elements. It is only as mutually implying each other, as integral factors of this system, that things have their being." (*Neo-Hegelianism* by Dr. Haldar. p. 6). And the systematic student of the Neo-Hegelian Movement will clearly realise how many of the implications of Hegel's philosophy have been pushed by its English interpreters to their logical consequences not often without slight but significant departures.

Lord Haldane began as a Hegelian in his contributions to a volume of essays published jointly with Professor Pringle-Pattison under the title *Essays in Philosophical Criticism.* But soon after he disclaimed himself from the Hegelian metaphysic of the Absolute by declaring in a short paper in the *Mind* (October, 1888) that the value of Hegelianism lay in merely being a point of view from which to criticise other methods of thoughts," and not in being the "ground upon which to place props for speculations in both ontology and philosophy." His distrust of Hegelian metaphysic however soon dissipated and in his *Pathway to Reality* (1903), which is "undoubtedly one of the best interpretations of the Hegelian philosophy in the English language," we find him recording "I am content to say that I am a Hegelian and wish to be called so." (*Pathway to Reality.* vol. II p. 85).

His *Reign of Relativity* (1921) and *Philosophy of Humanism (1922*) are the records of his mature thinking which by this time evolved itself into a fully articulated system out of the very powerful and pregnant seed of Hegelian philosophy sown in his early mind. The philosophical position that Lord Haldane has finally occupied in these works may be described as the *Philosophy of the Relativity of Knowledge* which is a logical corollary of Hegelian Absolutism, resulting from his emphasis on the side of the *contents* of our knowledge rather than on the side of the absolute self as such. Such a position arises, according to Haldane, from the inherent attempt of the finite experience to rise from its partial and incomplete comprehension of objects and classes of objects of the world at their different levels or orders into a knowledge of the "entirety" as distinguished from the Hegelian stand-point which starts with the abstract unity of the absolute self that heterises itself or finds its other in the differentiated plurality of the objects of the universe, which are therefore the moments or elements in the life of the absolute, only to return to itself in its enriched self-conscious concreteness. Haldane here reminds us that such an attempt to interpret knowledge is no new one but it is what objective idealism has been tacitly and at times explicitly making for over two thousand years. "I do not think" says Lord Hardane, "that the principle to which I am referring is any new one. I find it stated in somewhat different language not only in Aristotle and in Hegel, as well as in other writers but also elsewhere at various periods in the course of philosophical development." (*Contemporary British Philosophy, First Series* p. 142.) Thus when he speaks about the modern doctrine of Relativity formulated by Einstein, he points out that "the researches of Einstein have given a fresh importance to the Principle of Relativity" inplied in Hegel's criti-

cism of categories.

Lord Haldane's thesis is that *knowledge* in the absolute sense is identical with *reality* which is *one*; such knowledge as an ideal is 'foundational' to all forms of entity which arise within it. Outside knowledge nothing has meaning and nothing can accordingly be spoken of as having existence. To be meaningless is to be beingless. "It is their meaning and therefore their presence for mind which gives objects their actual existence. All reality actually falls within knowledge and owes its whole significance to it. Knowledge interpreted in this wide sense, and with its ideal completion taken into account thus discloses itself as not merely the foundation of reality but as indistinguishable from it. But so conceived knowledge cannot be adequately represented as the property of a finite subject existing independently of its object, or of a substance or thing or of mind regarded as a thing in nature. For things and minds alike, with the distinctions between them, have their significance and interpretation only as falling within it." (*Contemporary British Philosophy, First Series, P. 145*).

What then is knowledge from the particular human point of view? Lord Haldane is careful to distinguish between knowledge as an ideal and knowledge from the human point of view. He always uses the expression 'experience' and more specially 'human experience' to indicate such knowledge. 'Human experience' is indeed a type of knowledge but it is relational and as such unending in character, and seems to imply the immanence of knowledge as ideal and foundational to it.

Now though reality is one yet it seems to admit of degrees or levels or orders from different stand-points which spring from different interests or purposes in view. The conception of reality from one point of view may not have

equal value and significance with another conception of it from another point of view, but the varying outlooks may not conflict because they belong to different zones of intelligence, but certainly fall within the 'entirety" of knowledge and therein lies their relativity. The conceptions of reality formed by the mathematician and by the natural scientist in their own limited ways correspond to the different levels or grades of one and the same reality and do not suggest that there are different kinds of entity, and falling as they do within the entirety of knowledge, have their relative validity. As Dr. Haldar puts it, "In the constitution of the actual all of these conceptions are co-present." (*Neo-Hegelianism. P. 403*).

Here we notice an important point of difference between Lord Haldane and Bradley. For while with Lord Haldane every conception of reality from a particular standpoint has its relative validity, Bradley thinks that truth is a coherent whole of experience and so any one conception from any one standpoint is but an error, giving us only an appearance which is false as compared with Reality.

Haldane points out that his view of idealism is free from the criticism of the Neo-Realist who directs his polemic against Subjective Idealism or Mentalism which had its first inception in Locke's theory of Representative Perception. Locke treated knowledge as "an instrument separable from the known and unknown alike and capable of being laid on a table and pulled to pieces." He held that the mind acquires knowledge of things through the medium of ideas which form a screen as it were between the mind on the one side and the world of things on the other. Some of these ideas do and others do not resemble the qualities of things. Berkeley denied such distinction amongst the qualities of things and affirmed that the so-called things are our ideas, but believed in

the reality of mind as substance and as support of the ideas. And it is well known how Hume carried the Lockian principles to their utmost logical conclusion that if the sensations and ideas were all that could be and could be known, any talk of substance, mental or material, was meaningless. But it was Reid who undermined the theory of Representative Perception by pointing out that what is perceived is not an idea but a thing. In perception the mind is face to face with an objective fact and there is nothing intervening between the mind and the object. Reid thus clearly anticipated what the modern Realists maintain. The modern realists, like Reid, are now investing the object-world with qualities and relations of which it was deprived by the subjective idealists. They however retain a nominal distinction between mind and the object-world, assign to mind only the passive function of awareness, but their tendency is to submerge the 'subject-world' into the 'object-world' the mental into the non-mental, mind into matter. "If the New Realists went further," observes Dr. Haldar, "along the path pursued by them and had the courage to transfer to the side of things not only secondary qualities and universal relations but mind itself, they would see that mind is no isolated thing, it is no attribute or property of a thing." They would rather see that "it is the self-contained whole within which fall all distinctions made by thought, including the distinction between mind itself and the world of which it is conscious.' (*Neo-Hegelianism. P. 405*).

What we have stated above may be said to have given a pretty full account of what the Late Lord meant by his philosophy of Relativity. We would like to point out however that he did not bring out the fuller implication of the Relativity of knowledge. If, as he insisted, knowledge as an ideal is identical with reality and the complete comprehension of reality involves its interpretation from different levels

of thought, then he should have further pointed out that from every conceivable stand-point from which the reality is approached, knowledge as immanent subject knows itself as object; for each such object is," at the highest level, the unity of mind in which the whole world is focussed and represented. If even an organism is a unity belonging equally to its parts, far more so is mind. It is not apart from the objects presented to it, but is in each of them completely and indivisibly, as its ideality. In its own other it is itself. What is in all things as their ideal principle of unity is realised *as a complete whole* in every one of them. "If therefore, mind is to be regarded as the unity that goes out to the differences of objects, it must be conceived as immanent in each object whole and undivided, but not limited to it." And the difference of interpretation is due not simply to the difference of degrees or levels in reality but also to the difference of the points of view even at the highest level. And the mind that interprets is not separable from the stand-point from which the interpretation is made. Thus the ideal or absolute knowledge of Lord Haldane ought to be equated with the universal mind which is not an abstract unity, nor a unity differentiated into mere plurality of things, but a unity, a confluence of infinity of minds, which, at a lower level, are objective entities, and whose knowledge of the universe is a synopsis of the interpretations of the universe from an infinite number of view-points.

From this account of his theory of knowledge we have a natural transition to his view of Religion. According to Lord Haldane God cannot be a thing or a substance, nor is He a transcendent being beyond the reach of knowledge. He is the universal subject within which fall all things in all their distinctions and relations. As Haldane puts it "God must not stand for less than entirety and such an entirety

must be that within which all distinctions and resulting relations fall." "The mind of God must have in its other itself, and must recognise in that other just Himself in the form of otherness." (*Pathway to Reality*, Vol. II. p. 156). "Man and God are not numerically distinct subjects in knowledge. They are the one fundamental mind, disclosing itself in different degrees of logical stages in the progress of reality, but as identical throughout divergences in form. It is the identity that underlies the correspondence of our thoughts that relates man to his fellow men. It is the same identity in difference that relates him to God." (*Reign of Relativity*, p. 398). It is however the organic conditions which constitute the difference between man and man and which hamper the human mind to comprehend the divine nature and to envisage things from the divine point of view. And it is in the life of contemplation that we can transcend those limitations, and learn that "God is present in us and it is in God that our fully developed reality must centre."

Such was the Late Lord Haldane and his philosophy. We have not tried as we could not, within the small space, to give a comprehensive account of his philosophy and have thus referred only to the most salient features of his system, reserving a fuller account for a future occasion. One who can read between the lines of his writings will observe that there is some affinity between his theory of Relativity and the relativity of knowledge preached by the Vadantism of Saṁkara. We are especially interested in him because he was among those who sincerely appreciate the Indian writers on Philosophy, and his references to them point to a genuine philosophic freedom with which truth is to be approached irrespectively of the race or clime from which it may come. In him we have lost at least a friend and a philosopher, if not a guide in any direct

sense of the term. And if, as he himself thinks, with the cessation of the organic conditions the finite self realies its identity with absolute self the dissolution of his mortal coil will bring him surely that beatific vision which is the only ray of hope for the mortal that glimmers beyond the shore of death!

R. Müller Freienfels' Mysteries of the Soul.[1]

Among the recent developments in Metaphysic and Epistemology of Germany, the most significant is the one brought into vogue by Nicolai Hartmann who, as an enthusiastic follower of Kant, while admitting the necessity of the analysis of psychical phenomena as elements of knowledge, has gone beyond Kant in his emphasis on what are called the "irrational" factors of knowledge, so much so that even the rational or logical factors in knowledge have to be subordinated to or absorbed in sense presentation. In this way, Hartmann by his over-emphasis upon the irrational aspect of knowledge has come to belong to that movement which in its various forms has the common feature that in our knowledge an intuitive factor is the predominant element. This movement which gives intuition such an important function in knowledge was taken up by W. Dilthey among others. Rightly understood this emphasis upon the irrational factor of our knowledge can only mean that our knowledge is more of the nature of direct consciousness of what is purely actual and is not reducible to logical terms. This position has certainly a point which is invulnerable to any dilettantish analysis of knowledge proper. When Brentano or Dilthey advocated it what they meant was the immediate character of comprehension which inserts itself into the nature of things or experiences of others or the spiritual complexes within historical life, through an act of sympathy. This movement of intuitive comprehension has sometimes assumed that romantic and irrational attitude which has given us an immediate grip of the problems of life almost instinctively.

1. *Mysteries of the Soul* by R. Müller *Freienfels. Translated by Bernard Mial. Published by George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1929. Price 12s 6d. net.*

But this movement has become the source of a dangerous aberration with all its confusing consequences when it has found its champion in writers like Spengl, Keyserling, Gorgarten and our present author, Freienfels.

This confusion having its rise from the epistemological sphere has spread itself into other spheres including Life, Mind and Society and almost threatens the present culture of Germany. For instead of clarifying the truth involved in it, it rather mystifies our outlook by giving undue importance and show to the very expressions under which it pretends to present itself.

Mysteries of the Soul is one of those works by Freienfels which is responsible for such confusion. He has tried to show that the ultimate reality of the universe is life from which everything has proceeded. It is of the nature of an instinct or impulse and not of self-conscious reason, but has evolved itself into the world and mind which is only a practical manifestation of life. The act of evolution is continuous and never ending, because the values which are also evolved along with the other things and ideas of the universe are always subject to change and are therefore relative. Bul he believes that the social relations of man will gradually evolve entirely new relative values which will be conserved and epitomised in a Being which will be called God so that God is to be conceived not as a statically permanent Being which by its absolute nature determines the existence, maintenance and evolution of the universe but that God will be something which will belong to and therefore will be the result of evolution.

With this brief introduction to his general position in the scheme of present-day German thought, we now enter upon a more detailed examination of his book.

The volume under review is an attempt by the author to

present a practical philosophy of life in a number of chapters, the first of which is the metaphysical basis on which the rest of them are grounded as the psychological issues. Though the work cannot claim completeness it is yet an embodiment of the author's experiences of the varied aspects of the psycho-physical life of man, both individual and social. As the author himself prefaces: "By 'mysteries of the soul,' then, we do not mean such sensational results as have been sought or produced by the occultists in their darkness. We shall rather attack problems which are apparently illumined by the light of day, and facts which confront us all in our every-day life; and in so doing we shall try to show that things which are admitted may be very far from being recognised, behind what may seem to be the simplest facts of existence and that the profoundest mysteries may be at work." The author starts by saying that "a belief in the soul is inseparable from man; it follows him wherever he goes, intrudes into his dailv activities and even lays claim to be the actual reality" and indicates that if such a belief is gone the entire civilisation crumbles into nothingness. His main thesis is that by soul we are not to mean consciousness but life which is more than consciousness, and he supports this conception of soul by reference to the fact that all primitive cultures identified soul with life, so that "animated" and "alive" are, as conceptions, completely identical. The Greek word *psyche* does not by any means signify merely consciousness but life and the German words *Leben* and *Seele* which stand for the English words "life" and "soul" are interchangeable. Thus according to him "soul" is life, considered in its manifestation as consciousness, though consciousness is never the soul but only a practical manifestation of the soul, which operates even in unconscious life;" and body which the soul animates is nothing distinct in kind from the soul but is only a correlate of

soul in the unity of life.

The author then extends the concept of soul from the individual psychical life to the entire system of the universe and in fact he identifies the soul with the universe which is pervaded by life which is dynamic and purposive. "Thus the problem of the nature of the soul can be solved if at the same time we can solve the problem of the nature of the universe itself—the whole organic and inorganic universe." In this comprehensive sense of the soul the author has embraced the problems of man and of the world and of the relation between man as an individual conscious centre with a destiny of his own, and the world which partly shapes, and is partly shaped by man, and finally of God as the epitome of the highest values, which he considers in the last chapter on the Future of Religion. In the chapter on the Individual and his Destiny his main contention is that the individual soul is the architect of its own destiny which is the resultant of the action and reaction between the individual and his environment. By this he does not mean that the man is what he is by the operation of environment without reaction from him as the positivist concept of the *milieu* indicates, but that the individual makes for himself his own environment and transforms and transfuses it; and this he does by introducing into his environment his own forms of experience,—his style of speech, of dress and of art, his vocation, his choice of his sexual mate. His destiny is also determined by his intellect no less than, nay even more, by his impulse.

In the chapters entitled, "A Journey into the Past" and the "Dramaturgy of Life" the author wants to point out that every individual, in order to understand his own nature and his place and destiny in the scheme of the universe must also understand, compare and contrast his life of childhood in its various stages and its various relations to the world of abults,

and thereby learn what he is to-day and how he builds his schools, or churches, or wages war, or controls his household, or in one word how a man is what he is as an inseparable unit among other units which make up the system. This idea he further develops in the chapter on the 'Dramaturgy of Life" where he emphasises that our activities considered individually or socially are but seeming, not real in the same sense in which those of an actor on the stage are seeming, and that it is impossible to draw a hard-and-fast line between what is being or real and what is seeming or unreal. In this way the author has gone on to point out that whether in the life of politics or in art or in religion, "we find the same curious theatricality which is at once representation and misrepresentation, being indeed both in inseparable amalgamation." Even he has gone the length of suggesting that "the whole world is truly a Vanity Fair, a place of deceit and imposture;" and has concluded by saying: "Have not all the great thinkers indeed, from the authors of the Upanisads and Plato down to Kant and Schopenhauer, to say nothing of many more recent philosophers, always been of the opinion that our so-called reality may be, in its entirety, an illusion ?"

In the interesting chapter on the "Americanization of the Soul" the author speaks of the manner in which the Civilisation of Europe is progressing under the lead of America which, the author thinks, is giving us a new human type to which our very being is unconsciously tending. To him "Americanism" stands for a "*psychological notion*" which means "*mutational form* of the human species in general." The author seems to think that 'the American is the most accentuated type of the civilised man in general, a type which is appearing everywhere as an international phenomenon typical of the age and which predominates wherever modern

life is evolving. And to this idea he is led by his study of the traits of American life, the chief amongst which is the technicalisation or mechanisation of life conditioned by the need of railways, telegraphs, telephones and other mechanical inventions for ease of communication in the comparatively vast expanse of the continent of America. The other trait is the standardisation of life which consists in levelling down of all peculiarities, either of age or of sex or of complexion, to one uniformity to which all Americans conform and this standardisation applies not only to manners and customs of men but also to other things and even industrial products. The third trait is impersonalisation of the soul whereby the author means the totality of the unconscious foundations of the soul which seems to have no hold on the external life of the American, either emotional or intellectual, so that it is as changeful as the weather; for the American, the author thinks, lacks in what is called an organic unity of personality. In the sphere of politics as also of art, we have the same tendency in the American to standardisation, technicalisation, quantification and impersonalisation. "And the reason why the American conditions are so seductive to the rest of the world, and even becoming representative, lies in the fact that even in Europe and elsewhere a related type is emerging which cherishes the same ideals or at all events are yielding to the same suggestion." In the sphere of psychology Behaviorism rules all their ideas of psychical processes; in the sphere of industrial psychology Taylorism is the most characteristic form; in the sphere of knowledge Pragmatism decides between truth and falsity. The religion of the Americans has never depended on critical perception but always on the suggestibility of their character and has greater hold on adolescents and women who are more suggestible than the rest of the community. But after

all the author is not sanguine whether the American type of humanity really represents a higher phase of development, but he suggests that though as an individual the American displays unmistakable signs of retrogression, yet the Americans, considered as a social whole, mark an increased range and acuteness of knowledge and power, but still the author thinks that though there is a tendency in Europe to the Americanisation of the soul, yet it is not necessarily the ultimate goal of our civilisation, that we must pass through it and transcend it, so that new forms of life and ideal may emerge from it.

In the last chapter the author has attacked the problem of the Religion of the Future not by asking which religion is the best but the question of religion itself. Here, after a comparative study of the religions of the East and West, though superficial and inadequate, he intends to bring out the common property of all religions which he thinks to be the *mythos.* The modern man may not see anything transcendental in the myth in which all religion originated, but the myth had always a meaning without which no relegion would have been possible. Even Christianity is no exception to this. The doctrine of Miracles, of Sin and Atonement, and of the sacrificial death of Christ, when shorn of their mythical charm, cannot appeal to the Christian mind. At the same time the myths, as myths, without their ethical and social orientation cannot claim to have anything to do with the origin of any modernised religion. Hence the author thinks that the religion of the future will also have the myths not of the type of the product of imagination, but should represent the symbolic character of all our knowledge of the universe as a whole. "Hence, the mythos of all our coming religion will not be a mythos of the ill-founded and deceptive knowledge but the mythos of a well founded and

discerning ignorance." And the new religion, the author thinks, will be a transvaluation of our old values, will not be a view of life isolated from the universe, but the life which is an integral part of it, "for it is not *we* live our life but rather the infinite life lives us, kindles in us the miraculous light of the conscious, *i. e.*, not merely personal consciousness but also universal consciousness in which the ego becomes conscious of the universe, and the universe becomes conscious as the ego." And "the capacities and powers of man may be so increased by co-operation that entirely new relative values may come into existence; so that God as the epitome of the highest values should be sought not in the beginning of the world, but in the future; so that God *is* not, but is *becoming.*" The author thus fits in the doctrine of Panpsychism with a modified form of the doctrine of Emergent Evolution of Alexander in so far as the former has started with life as the basic principle—a gratuitous amalgam of views to which we of course do not subscribe.

The starting principle of the universe is *the psyche* or soul which is equated with life and is therefore more of the nature of an impulse than of a rational or intelligent potentiality. Hence the urge of that principle to become and develop up to God can be but an irrational *nisus* of Alexander with its characteristic difficulty of explaining the *why* of the entire subsequent go of the process in this and in no other direction. His position smells also of Bergsonian irrationalism in so far as it resembles the *elan vital* of Bergson. To us it appears that all this patchwork and consequent inconsistency would have been well avoided, had the author started with the presupposition of an indeterminate suprarational potentiality whose partial actualisation means the starting into evolution of the world of human experience which again is nothing other than the self-limitation of that potentiality.

The author has however to be congratulated on the lucid and chatty style in which he has tried to clarify the "Mysteries of the Soul." Instead of confining himself to abstract thinking he has relieved the abstruseness of the subject by citations from concrete aspects of every-day life and familiar facts of science and history. The book, therefore, interests the reader while it instructs him, and will appeal not simply to the learned few, but also to the lay public who may have interest in the philosophy of work-a-day life. The translator deserves no mean praise for the racy and unstilted flow of his rendering, making us forgetful that we are reading a translation of a German original.

ON THE CONCEPT OF PROGRESS

In appearing in the role of a critic of the opener of the symposium on the Concept of Progress I have had to enter the lists at a two-fold disadvantage. First, owing to some alteration in the Congress programme I have had to undo all that I had written out as my view on progress as the pre-arranged opener of the debate; and secondly, I have had to make impromptu observations on what the actual opener has expressed as his own theory of progress. Reminding my audience of these two drawbacks in my position, I now enter upon my criticism of the opener's proposition.

But before doing so it is of the utmost importance for me also to remind my hearers that a great many of our concepts have suffered from ambiguity resulting from confusion between a question of fact and a question of interpretation, between things and events in their nude actuality and the unbridled subjective colouring which is thrown over them by our habits of traditional thoughts, imagination and temperament. On the one side, there is the tendency of our mind to cling to our old and convenient ways of thinking and glibly to talk about things which require no serious searching into matters of fact; on the other, there is a perceptible growth of an alleged sceptical survey of facts ready to face the unpleasantness against conservative ways of thinking. And thanks to the genius of William James who has, for the first time, successfully warned the philosophic world against 'tender-minded' absolutists who palm off the universe as a rounded whole, no matter whatever the glaring facts of the empirical world reveal to the contrary. And such a warning has opened up an outlook, sceptical you may call it, but not without real philosophical importance.

A careful student of the modern currents of philosophy will observe that they can be broadly classed under two heads: some coming under the head of Scientific Philosophy, others under that of Religious Philosophy. Those philosophers may be said to belong to the School of Religious Philosophy who start with God, in some form or other, as the ultimate principle of the Universe, evolving, sustaining and developing every thing from the minutest atom to the enormous mountain, every phenomenon natural, social and psychical with a purpose of his own, thus making up a system of the Universe where every thing and event is in its proper place and function. There are, however, others who belong to the school of Scientific Philosophy and emphasise, on the other side, the facts of the empirical world and endeavour to read them aright in their proper worth with a strictly scientific and logical outlook even at the risk of contradicting, or presenting a diametrically opposite picture to what the absolutists give of their 'block universe.' If one commits oneself to the Religious School of Philosophy, therefore, one is hypnotised into the belief that the whole system of things has been tending towards the fulfilment of the purpose of an intelligent divine principle which so shapes its contents and adjusts its movements as always to make a right move towards the progressive realisation of its own purpose. To him every thing would be in its proper place and function and an all-round progress a reality; and if there were any thing evil it will be but a disguised good, for the ultimate principle to whose ever progressive life the whole system of things is thought to be tagged on, being in itself good, no evil can proceed from it; evils are more apparent than real and the world of ours is the best of all possible worlds.

Apparently with predilections in favour of this Religious School of Philosophy outlined above, the opener of the debate

has pinned his optimistic faith on the possibility of an all-round progress into which our world has so long run and will continue running for all time to come. His philosophy of progress is based on the assumption of an ultimate reality which he calls spiritual and divine. Such a reality he describes as creative in the sense that every higher form is a creation by that reality of a situation out of the lower as compared with which it is new and different. He further makes his ultimate principle to be the synthesis of the values or ideals of truth, beauty and goodness, and states that the whole cosmic process is tending towards the realisation of these ideals; and still further such an ultimate reality is a dynamic principle which renders progress an accomplished fact and but for which progress would have been a fiction. And he concludes that "to be is to live and to live is to progress," and supports his conclusion by his reference to alleged evidences of progress in nature, history and society.

Now one of the many questions which one is tempted to ask, is whether in handling the concept of progress we are to begin from the end as the opener of the debate has done, or with the beginning; whether we are to begin with the assumption of an ultimate dynamic spiritual principle and proceed deductively from this assumed principle to the conclusion that the world as a part and parcel of that supposed progressive being is making a steady and continuous advance towards the good; or we are to start with the facts of our experience and then rise inductively to the view whether progress has at all been a reality? If we pledge ourselves to what we have called religious philosophy and begin with a speculative bias in favour of an ultimately synthetic principle in which all things and events are to receive a convenient

harmony and synthesis, every movement of things and events whether forward or retrograde is bound to be interpreted as progress. But does not this mean a rehabilitation, in a somewhat modern garb, of the old scholastic theosophy which smells of God in everything? Nor is there sufficient warrant for the assumption of the objective unity of the ideals of truth, beauty and goodness in this alleged spiritual principle towards which the whole system of things is supposed to be endlessly progressing. To speak of the values or the ideals of truth, beauty and goodness as objectively real is to make an equally metaphysical assumption for which there seems to be no plausible justification. The values or value-judgments can have significance only when they affect us or have relations to human valuers, by way of facilitating the needs of their very being. To give an objective complexion to the values out of relation to humanistic ends is to make them, as it were, so many placards fixed on the firmament which have no concern with the individual beings of this world below, who, however, are the actual evaluators. Values to be of real value for human beings must be the subjective evolutes of the individual centres of consciousness in their transaction with physical and social environment affecting them either for better or for worse. And to think that, as Plato did unwarrantably, values are eternal realities enjoying a transcendent existence but at the same time having some unaccountable relation with the world of experience is simply to hypostatise abstractions. If objectivity in any sense can be attached to values, it can only be done by way of reference to the interests of the individual selves in their intersubjective intercourse in a social whole. What is emphasised here is this that values instead of being objective and eternal categories are the results of action and reaction between individual and social mind and the world outside, by

way of the promotion of their psycho-physical needs and interests. "Valuation," says Prof. H. D. Bhattacharya of Dacca University, "is factual in relation to the self as a state of pleasure or composure but is at the same time projected on to existence as a tertiary quality." (*The Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress, Bombay, p. 444*).

It appears then from our point of view that values by reference to which an advance in any department of the universe from one stage to another is to be adjudged a distinct stage in progress are not absolute but only relative, not objective but quasi-subjective and subject to change in needs and interests of the psychophysical life of the self in its relation to not-self. In the light of the above account of the values therefore it is hazardous to pledge that the whole course of the universe has had a smooth and uninterrupted approximation to absolute and universal values as the religious school of philosophy does. The moment one commits oneself to a religious philosophy one is bound hand and foot against combating even illusions and unwarrantable beliefs. To such a one teleogy becomes the spectacles through which one is forced to visualise things despite overwhelming evidences of dysteleology; facts are idealised, and nature deified. A *process* of nature or of mind is read a *progress*,—empirical facts or phenomena which need not have any colouring of human feelings, but which science impartially regards as neutral events of natural history, are supposed to reveal a law of development towards good underlying the universe. Even evolutionism which claims to be a rigidly scientific doctrine formulated as a challenge against theistic philosophy by the acutest votaries of science, has not been spared from being exploited either in its cosmic or biological or social aspect by the Religious School of Philosophy.

The contention that the ultimate principle of the universe

not only dynamic but also creative is but an extension of the same Religious and Mystical Philosophy only in the Bergsonian line of thought. To admit progress as a fact is to have an implicit faith in the dynamic character of the underlying principle of the universe which, working out its own realisation effects progress indeed. But since such a faith has the implication of prediction of the goal so that a certain stage in the progress is only an old thing already anticipated, the concept of 'creativeness' has been introduced just in the line of Bergson to indicate that every higher stage in the cosmic process is a new situation, richer in content and greater in complexity than its predecessor, so that the higher stage is something new and different from the lower; and it is held in this way that all possible stages of development through which the world of ours has come to be what it is and those through which it is going to approximate its ever receding destiny, are all linked together into the synthesis or unity of the creative principle. Now it is apparent that in this conception of creative synthesis a compromise is attemted to be made between the absolute idea of Hegel and the *elan vital* of Bergson. But it needs hardly be pointed out that this unnecessary patch-work, this gratuitous introduction of the Bergsonian concept of 'creativeness' into the idea of the ultimate spiritual principle, stands self-condemned in view of the fact that Bergson is a pledged enemy of unity or synthesis, and of the attribute of intelligence in the ultimate principle, which characterises the Absolute of Religious philosophy. Differentiation or disintegration and not synthesis or unity is, according to him, the law which guides the creative impulse of Duration, which is his ultimate reality. Besides, a careful sifting of facts and phenomena of the world would incline an impartial thinker not so much to the glib and cheap absolutism which presents an all-bright picture of the universe without any hitch or jar, retrogression or declivity, degeneration or pitfall, as to the view of a real throbbing world

with all its good and evil, truth and falsity, advance and regress, lapse and regeneration, of a world as it factually is and not as ideally it is rounded to be. We do not, of course, encourage either the Bergsonian or the absolutist view of the universe; what we encourage we shall try to formulate in the sequel.

In the meanwhile we must urge that the assumption of an absolute creative spiritual principle makes an easy room for its necessary corollary that progress is the very law of the universe. To admit *a priori* that the wheel of the cosmic process is the part of a supposed intelligent creative principle whose nature is progress, is but another way of assuming that progress is the law of the universe, and an attempt has been made to support this affirmation by adding that "if progress is not the law of the universe the concept of progress is simply a fiction with no objective basis," as if a disproof or inadequate proof of progress from facts of experience as far as attainable would be an end to all philosophic speculation, so that a pathetic appeal to the biased and the prejudiced in favour of progress remains to be the only makeshift to fall back upon. But if the basic principle has been found not to bear scrutiny its corollary is bound to meet the same fate. And we can, on this ground, pass over without bestowing much of our thought on it, the law of social progress formulated by Kant, Hegel, Comte and others as a purely mechanical formula for the description of a living, free process of social life which knows no stereotyped and inflexible course to follow. After all that has been said with regard to the general course of the cosmic process, there hardly remains any further necessity of showing that progress is not necessarily the law of life; and the expression 'to be is to live and to live is to progress' sounds like a meaningless platitude without grounding in facts.

Our next point will be to show by reference to the stern facts of the world of science, history, politics, philosophy and

religion that the idea of so-called progress, despite overwhelming evidences against it, has worked like a nightmare over the credulous minds of the modern age. Our main concern will be here to refer to those alleged instances of progress with a view to indicating that in themselves they are not sufficient to make one conclude that there has been an uninterrupted advancement, that progress is the very law of existence, that progress is not an accident but a necessity. There might be picked up stray instances here and there at random which might be interpreted from particular angles of vision as indications of progress, but a more careful observer who takes stock of the entire course of events will not be astonished to find that every apparent instance of alleged progress is yoked with a corresponding running down, or as Dr. Freeman puts it, "In history every step in advance has also been a step backwards," or in the language of Dean Inge, "the fruit of the tree of knowledge always draws man from some paradise or other." But the superstition of progress has had such a strong hold upon sophisticated minds that even the historian, the scientist, the philosopher, the political scientist and the theologian, who are expected to have an impartial regard for truth as revealed from the march of events, have all alike been unable to disabuse their minds of this nightmare. Open any authentic work of history written by the nineteenth century historian, and you will find that the burden of his story is that there has been a continuous flow of progress through the Dark Ages up to the present day. If a nation or a religion or a school of art dies, the historian exclaims, "why, it was not worthy to live!' The political philosopher, obsessed with the bias for progress is found to declare invariably that what form of government is coming must be right. But every one knows how many forms of government came and went and with what tangible

and lasting benefit to the governed except perhaps giving them jealousy, class-war and aggrandisement of the party in power for the time being. So a student of history who is familiar with cyclical changes and long swings of pendulum will certainly be very cautious in his view of the present state of political affairs. In the language of Dean Inge, "the votaries of progress mistake the flowing tide for the river of eternity, and when the tide turns they are likely to be left stranded like the cork and scraps of sea-weed which mark the high waterline." And it is no wonder, therefore, that democracy which promised relief from autocracy has degenerated into ignorance, low taste and lack of discipline. And are not the nations really governed by some mysterious caucus rather than by the people themselves? Is Socialism, with all its promises for equidistribution of land and wealth, a sufficient improvement upon its rivals in the field of politics and social science? Has it really been, and will it ever be, successful to equalise economic, intellectual and social disparities amongst the human kind? And thank God that it has not, to the utter disaster in the social, political and intellectual life of man by its encouragement of sloth, indifference and smothering of the genius, as its inevitable consequences! The economic situation of the present generation is the most appalling of all problems. The proportion between the income and expenditure of the modern man has become so alarmingly discrepant owing to a false standard of living that it has become almost impossible for the present day middle class to live a decent, healthy and respectable life with moderate livelihood. And the root of all this economic stress is traceable to exploitation amongst co-traders, foolish fascination for finery and a craze for false respectability of living even beyond means.

The influence of the superstition of progress on man's phi-

losophical speculation is no less remarkable. The oracle of Hegel, that both the world of mind and reality proceed dialectically, so that in the world of thought and philosophy there has been and will be a continuous synthesis or development as an approximation to, or a realisation of, an infinite self-conscious being, is no longer believed by the philosophic world, and his critics have accused him of teaching that his Absolute first attained full self consciousness at Berlin in the nineteenth century ! Comte with his curious theory of "the three stages" failed to give us any tangible connexion of his philosophy with the real progress in the thought-world. Apart from this triviality of the Hegelian and Comtean theories of the progress of thought, one would pause to pass a verdict of advancement on the recent tendencies of philosophical speculation seeing that, while there has been a marked accuracy and refinement in the interpretation of the problems of the universe in terms of physics and mathematics and in the absorbing of materials obtained by empirical method, there has grown on the other side a distaste for all that is revealed by intuition. Further many of the recent standpoints in philosophy are either rehabilitation or distortion of the old ways of thinking.

Nor is it easy to establish in any satisfactory way that there has been real progress in the religion of mankind. Are we prepared to admit that the religious views of the present-day Indians are decidedly superior to ancient types of religion, say, Vedic worship or ancient Buddhism or Jainism ? Can we with our hands laid on our heart aver that in the matter of religious purity and sincerity we are a jot better than our so-called barbaric ancestors ? Can any Christian or Mahomedan of the present day affirm on oath that he has really advanced in his religious life from the stage in which any of his sincere co-religionists of the past found himself ? Coming

to the bodily and mental sides of human existence the votaries of progress will find themselves worse off. A steady decline in the physical features, strength and longevity of man can be shown with mathematical exactitude to hold an inverse ratio with the march of time. Let Eugenics, though infant in its career yet bold in its clamours, fancy all possible vagaries of utopian regeneration of human type, but the hard facts of human degeneracy as compared with those of the past generation of human existence will unmistakably point rather to regress than to progress on the physical side. As Dean Inge puts it, "On biological ground there is no reason to expect it. No selection in favour of superior types is now going on; on the contrary civilisation tends now, as always, to weeding out of the best.........the best hope of stopping this progressive degeneration is in the science of eugenics. But this science is still too tentative to be made the basis of legislation and we are not yet agreed what we should breed for." The same remarks hold good of the intellectual side of man. Who can make bold to assert that the modern average man is superior to any of the bye-gone days in point of intensity or depth of comprehension, though of course it may be true that the present generation surpasses the past ones only in extensity or breadth of knowledge ? Is there anybody amongst us of the present day prepared to assert that he is intellectually superior to Plato or Śankara except that he is only an heir to the heritage of accumulated knowledge of his predecessors ? And the task of establishing uninterrupted progress seems far harder in the sphere of moral life. Here we can at once press the question whether the modern civilised man behaves better under the same circumstances than his so-called uncivilised ancestors. Was an Athenian of the Socratic ideal less moral than any modern civilised European ? Or were the Buddha and his followers lower

in the scale of moral rectitude than any person to-day? Sometimes absence of temptation in a particular generation may produce an idea in our mind that it is morally superior to its predecessors, but that only illustrates an old saying "that the devil has a clever trick of pretending to be dead." Think of the lowest depths of atrocities, bloodthirstiness and treachery to which the European nations stooped during the last World War, and consider the opinion of Lord Bryce's commission that the cruelties that the Germans perpetrated in Belgium and France have no counterpart in history within the past three hundred years; and to talk of the League of Nations as a sufficient guarantee against any re-enactment of the atrocious scenes in future is the height of folly, and betrays hopeless ignorance of the cannibalism which lies latent in the so-called civilised nations of the present day Europe waiting for proper time and place for its hideous orgies.

The nineteenth century Europe marks ineed a marvellous period of scientific discvoery and progress contributing to the material comforts of human existence especially by its mechanical inventions. But while, on the one hand, mechanical improvement replaced manual labour, economised time, and brought all possible material comforts within easy reach of man, it has not been without its drawbacks which have far outbalanced its advantages. A man who would in the past fain undergo the fatigue of walking several miles, has grown in this mechanical age so loath to fatigue that he would even scramble into a tramcar to cover the distance of a mile. The twentieth century man is too impatient of the necessarily late output of manual labour to look into its consequential harms both to himself and to community. We cannot get a better picture of the evil effects of the present mechanical civilisation on man than what is portrayed by the following words of Dr. Freeman: "Mechanism by its reactions on man and his environment is antagonistic to human welfare. It has destroyed industry and replaced it by mere labour; it has degraded and vulgarised the workshopman; it has destroyed social unity replaced it by social disintegration and class antagonism to an extent which directly threatens civilisation; it has injuriously affected the structural type of society by developing its organisation at the expense of the individual; it has endowed the inferior man with political power which he employs to the common disadvantage by creating political institutions of a socially destructive type: and finally by its reactions on the activities of war it constitutes an agent for the wholesale physical destruction of man and his works and the extinction of human culture. It is thus strictly analogous to those antibodies by which the existence of aggregates of the lower organisms is brought to an end." And we supplement his remarks by adding that the worst consequences of mechanised life are that it has been giving us more emissaries of death than heralds of healthy regeneration, nurturing the germs of deadly diseases unknown to humanity and incurable by medical science, and creating unemployment, discontent and unrest to the extent of shaking the very foundation of modern civilisation. And this is perhaps the most intricate dilemma before the world to-day.

It has been claimed that progress always means development from the simpler to the more complex but it remains to be seen whether that is really the case. There are spheres of growth and development upon what has gone before, not due to complication but rather to simplification. The old Spencerian conception of evolution that it is always from homogeneity to heterogeneity has long been exploded by the researches of modern scholars. The truth seems to be that it is not so much complexity as simplicity that marks in most cases real evolution and development, and as Dr. Taylor puts

it, in "*Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge*," "irrelevant complexity is a mark of imperfect adaptation and its absence may be an indication of relatively late stage in the evolutionary process." Thus complexity may be regarded as irrelevant and secondary in many cases. In the sphere of of biology it is noticed that one of the regular characteristics of the adaptive process in the development of vertebrate skeleton is the reduction of complexity where the complexity would stand in the way of complete adaptation. As an illustration of this we might cite the way in which the original pattern of the five-toed foot has been reduced to greater simplicity in the case of the species like the horse, the ox, birds, etc., where the five-toed foot will be ill adapted to the creature's life. Many rudimentary vestiges of organs which still linger in the human frame indicate how they are on the way to falling off without prejudice to the more delicate adaptation of the human organism to the environment required by the ever-increasing needs of life. Social customs, religious rites, fashions of dress and forms of speech have tended more and more to simplification so as to be adapted to the changing walks of civilised life. It needs no elaboration to indicate how the present-day man of society either in the East or in the West has outgrown the cumbrous and uncouth manners of greeting, conversation, etc. The Protestant Christian shrugs his shoulder at the elaborate paraphernalia of the Catholic mode of worship. The modern Hindu has long discarded the superannuated appendages of the old form of religious worship. The manner of dress of to-day shows how foolishly costly and superfluous the garments of the past had been, so that 'back to nature' has already been the cry of the fashionable world. The philologists will corroborate this 'evolution by degeneration' when they state that many of the modern languages of the civilised world are on the way to

simplification; for it is held that complexity of language is more a hindrance than a help to the precise expression of thought. And as a consequence there have been instituted in various parts of the world boards of experts to devise ways and means to effecting simplicity and rational pruning of much that is unnecessary either in spelling or in idioms or in inflexions with a view to increasing facility of retention, reproduction and creating more lasting phonetic effect. The modern English language has emerged from the inflexional Latin and Greek languages after purging of many of the appendages, and has a decided advantage over its cousin modern German which is encumbered with elaborate case system still retained for the noun. America has far out-distanced the United Kingdom in its elision of apparently superfluous letters from most English words. The Bengali language of to-day furnishes the brightest example of the principle of development by degeneration in the linguistic sphere. The recent attempts in Turkey not only to substitute Roman characters in place of her own but also to trim her native language to keep pace with the modern civilised languages in simplicity, supply another instance in point.

After all that we have already stated as to the metaphysical assumption underlying the theory of progress, and dogmatic deductions therefrom of the details, such as the problem of evil sublated in good, of the optimistic interpretation of all natural phenomena, of the objective existence of values and their unity and embodiment in the divine life which is creative and synthetic, drifting the whole universe along the path of continuous felicity; and also after all that we have stated by a disinterested appeal to facts of empirical existence which speak more cogently about the ethico-emotional neutrality of natural phenomena than of an ever progressive world, we need hardly adduce any more elaborate grounds

for the conviction of my audience as to what my opinion on the problem of progress will be. My method, I repeat, is empirical and inductive rising from particulars of empirical facts to an idea of progress, if it is at all attainable. Deduction in philosophy has done the worst of mischiefs not unknown to students of philosophy. If a logical and scientific approach is to be preferred to a blind, dogmatic one, Idealism or better Religious Idealism with its unwarrantable assumptions and utopian extravagances is but a delusion of the mind which the mind may like to live in, but which runs every moment the risk of dispersion. Even within the fold of Religious Idealists who are professed Progressivists there has been a noticeable flutter of reactionary suspicion as to a universal progress; and Idealists like Pringle-Pattison rest contented with the view that progress is confined to the empirical and temporal world and has no significance as applied to the universe as a whole. He remarks: "From an ultimate metaphysical point of view, it appears to me, our conclusion must be that progress is predicable only of the part which can interact with other parts, and, in such interaction has the nature of the whole to draw upon. It is unintelligible as applied to the whole." (*Idea of God*, p. 383). Dean Inge who confesses that he is "unable to distinguish between philosophy and religion" has the frankness to admit that "the arrogance and absurdity of arguing from the historical progress of humanity—assuming that this can be proved—to progress as a law of the whole universe and of its Maker become more apparent the more we think about them." He goes on to suggest in the same strain the questions: 'Is the idea of a *progressus ad infinitum* either thinkable or consoling? How can there be progress in an infinite whole?" "This bastard philosophy," he adds, so naively anthropocentric and so incompatible with any scientific view of the universe, is intelligible as a by-product of what has been called the age of complacency."

(*Contemporary British Philosophy*, First Series, pp. 199 to 200).

Now, from our impartial account of the facts of the world of experience and from our review of the Religious Idealism of the advocates of progress, not unrelieved by notes of dissent amongst even some of their own camp, we are in a position to formulate our own opinion on the problem of progress, though of course we are not unaware that progress is one of those ultimate problems in dealing with which one is in constant danger of falling into what Plato called "a bottomless pit of nonsense." A study of facts of our empirical world has sufficiently taught us that every step in advance in any department is counter-balanced by a retrograde step in another, that progress has never been continuous but only *per saltum*. It is not the law of existence either. To be able to predicate the concept of progress of the universe as a whole presupposes infinity of knowledge on the part of man, which is impossible. Progress, therefore, can always mean an advancement in some spheres of existence with very great limitations. Further the application of the concept of progress within these limited spheres again involves evalution by the individual or collective mind by its own standards or values which again are subject to constant revision. To take progress as the law of the universe or as rooted in it or as a necessary consequence of an assumed spiritual creative principle is evidently going beyond what human mind can claim to know, and we need hardly repeat that the facts of nature on which progress must be based, must be judged by human standards of value; but unfortunately a great majority of empirical facts do not lend themselves to an interpretation favouring all-round progress. Hence by elimination we are left with an irreducible *minimum* which may be, and in fact is interpretable as evidences of a very limited progress. What we

mean to emphasise is this that excepting in the matter of accumulating the intellectual bequests of our predecessors and of the implements and appliances conducive to the promotion of creature comforts it will be foolhardiness to generalise that there has been a uniform progress. Besides as already ppinted out, the standards or values by reference to which progress is to be judged are subject to constant change, being in themselves the emergents out of interaction between self-conscious centres and their external environment always tending to promote or hinder the psycho-physical needs and interests of man. So what might have appeared in some age as a distinct advance upon the other previous to it may be, and in fact has been, appraised as a miserable deterioration from the point of view of another generation with a different standard of judgment. In this way we find in history approbation and rejoice in one particular turn of events side by side with disapprobation and disappointment in another course of happenings. This, of course, should not give any tinge of pessimism to our view-point for we have no incurable bias against what is apparently good and beautiful in nature and society; nor are we anxious to be accredited optimists, pledged to a rosy view of things. Our approach to the problem of progress, based as it is on the hard facts of nature, has all through been kept clean from the contamination of feeling, as all scientific and philosophical study should be. And such an approach cannot but compel us to remain content with stating, in the light of facts, that there is the mental world and the world of extramental reality, each independent of the other but at the same time entering into a relation of reciprocity to each other so that the mental series goes on along with the extramental series, each having an empirically real relation of interaction with the other, and that the mental series in its interaction with the extramental, adjusts

itself with the extramental according to its needs and interests which also emerge from such interaction. And those adjustments of the mental series with the extramental will be interpreted as progress which are most conducive to the promotion of the so emerging needs and interests of the self-conscious centres. To indulge in more than this would be to introduce mysticism whose aim is not to face facts in their true empirical light but always to project over them a supramundane halo too dazzling to the unbiased eye.

It is interesting to note that the trend along which the civilisation of the world has been moving, *viz.*, that it is precipitating from bad to worse conditions of life, replacing sincerity of purpose by sham and hypocrisy, undermining the old solidarity of social relations by engrafting those that are injurious to the social life as a whole, by reducing religion to a mere matter of personal idiosyncrasy, making material prosperity to be the criterion of real aristocracy—all this was anticipated by the Hindu sages in their conception of *Kaliyuga*. And the remedy proposed by them was the development of a cult of *Vakti to Krishna*, *i. e.*, the development of a Theistic Idealism which was expected by them to transform Indian life and to reconstruct the society and religion on a new basis. Such a pious hope has also been entertained by some of the Western Meliorists like William James, James Ward, Dean Inge and others. Dean Inge, for instance, after a note of despair as to the present state of civilisation, has thrown out to us a pious hope by adding that "the time seems ripe for a new birth of religious and spiritual life which may remould society as no less potent force would have the strength to do." (*Outspoken Essays*, Second Series, p. 253). Professor Radhakrishnan in his latest work "*Kalki* or the *Future of Civilisation*" has re-echoed with his marvellous powers of expression and brilliancy of exposition the

same melioristic strain and emphasised that 'Religious Idealism seems to be the most hopeful political instrument for peace which the world has ever seen. We cannot reconcile men's conflicting interests and hopes so long as we take our stand on duties and rights." And he concludes that the present shortcomings will be removed by the process of increasing dominion of the spirit which has lost its hold upon human mind under the triumphs of scientific progress that has almost completely killed religion. All this is very good so far as it goes; hope is the only prop in the present state of our civilisation for the falling spirit of man. Hope endures life, and is the potent spur to action, and utter lack of hope is the spiritual ruin of man. And here lies the very corner-stone of optimistic Idealism. But even here will not one be allowed the freedom to think that in the last resort hope is but a will-o'-the-wisp receding as one approaches it? Was not optimistic faith working all through the course of civilisation, and despite its hopeful beckonings has not the world tended to a steady regress until it has found itself in its present condition? Reminding once more my audience that I am no pledged pessimist I would like to add that let this hope in the religious reconstruction continue to be clung to, but perhaps without any tangible effect on that to which the world is really tending.

We cannot conclude our observations on progress without suggesting in more definite terms where the motive force of the limited progress we have spoken of lies. It lies not in an immanent universal spiritual reality as the Religious Philosophy assumes, but rather in the *human impulse* which goads him to activities favourable to his betterment and felicity. We can name that impulse as constructive in so far as it constructs or creates and does not stop before creating something which is promotive of the psycho-physical needs and interests

of man either personal or social. The scientist, for example, confined within the four walls of his laboratory goes on from experiment to experiment even for his whole life with a view to discovering a new theory not so much because he consciously realises a full-fledged plan of his work, as because of a vague but constructive impulse of the nature of appetite which goads him to his pursuit which he cannot but make and the result of his constructive impulse is the wondrous discovery. Such has also been the motive force for the painter, for the discoverer of a new continent, for the scientific inventor, and for the religious reformer alike. This is true not only of the individual mind but equally of the group-mind. Not one man but many men at a time or even a race may dedicate their lives to this vague constructive impulse leading to something ameliorating not only to themselves out to the world at large. Such a race we call civilised or progressive. We are led to this view of the motive force of progress by a psychological analysis and not a mystical assumption in which every change or phenomenon is attempted to be explained by a principle of the unseen having no concern for humanity and the concrete everyday world of ours. It is thus the human effort or striving and not the divine intervention that is at the root of all advancement, and this is the psychology of progress. And the instances of human activities destructive of civilisation are also accountable by reference to the human impulse, not constructive or creative in this case, but only destructive. So it is man in his active relations to the world, either constructive or destructive, that has determined and will determine the movement and direction of civilisation.

VALUE AND PERSONALITY.

The problem of value has in recent times occupied perhaps the foremost position in philosophy. Even amongst the so-called scientific writers of fact the consciousness of value is gradually gaining its legtimate ground; they are beginning to think of things and events not wholly in terms of fact, but largely in terms of value. They are gradually discovering that all our estimations are after all evaluations. Value and evalution are not foreign to facts, rather fact and value imply each other; reality is ideality, existence is worth, only from a different outlook and one is really inseparable from the other. "There can be no existence without value and no value without existence."[1] Reality is neither mental nor material but a realm in which thought and thing, fact and value, are inseparable, neither having any existence apart from its correlative. This much is coming to be realised by most varied forms of philosophical thinking, by pragmatists and axiologists, by idealists, both subjective and objective, and by implication at least even by some exponents of realism. The value-consciousness of to-day, however, is no innovation into philosophic consciousness, but only a legitimate and inevitable development of our estimation of things. So long as the fact was there, there was the value, only that the value was not discernible equally in all ages and by all minds. To quote Professor Münsterberg,[2] "Through the world of things shimmered first weakly, and then even more clearly the world of values." The concept of value, there-

1. W. M. Urban's article, *Value, Logic dnd Reality*, in the Prcceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy.
2. Prof. Münsterberg quoted in "*Philosophy To*-day" by Schaub and others.

fore, is only the fuller stature of our philosophic consciousness developing in its proper environment and direction within the scheme of our estimation of life and the universe.

The problem of value to-day has acquired such a large dimension that an exhaustive treatment of value in all its bearings within the limits of this present paper is simply out of the question. The questions generally raised as to the nature, origin and development of the concept of value may be subsumed under two more fundamental questions, one psychological or phenomenological, and the other metaphysical or more technically, axiological. Value considered from the psychological point of view has its origin in human desires and feeling; it is the affective life of man that comes to make things valuable, in so far as they influence it well or ill, agreeably or disagreeably. Value is thus a matter of feeling and nothing else. Slightly different from the account of this school, but falling within it, is that of the pragmatists who read value in things in so far as they lead the agent to fruitful activity. The value of a thing, they say, depends not on the emotive affection, but rather on the conative satisfaction of the man concerned.

The general outlook of the psychological and pragmatic school, however, having tendency to make value empirical, individualistic and relative, has failed to satisfy the demands of the metaphysical school who have naturally raised the questions: Is value a mere subjective addendum to reality? Or is it a part of the nature of things? Or is it the essence of reality? And these are the fundamental metaphysical questions on value and reality, and have been responsible for the "Great Divide" in philosophy, between Realism and Idealism; the realist maintaining that value is an indefinable *quality* attaching to existence as sense-quales to objects or even essences, and

the axiologist emphasising that value is the *character* or *condition* of existence and of our knowledge of existents.

From this general but short and analytical survey of the value-questions of to day we now pass on to that more special one we are primarily concerned with, and that is the relation between value and personality. Here the question further dissolves itself into: Whether value exists only in, for and through personality either individual or universal: Or whether it is ever personal or impersonal and enjoys an absolute existence apart from and independently of valuing persons: Or whether personality is itself a value; Or whether all values being pragmatic and relative in a sense the ultimate reality as a non-personal existence is independent of value.

These questions evidently presuppose an idealistic attitude to life and the universe, but the idealists are not all at one in their handling of them. Among the idealists who make value and personality to be co-extensisive we may mention T. H. Green, William Temple and others. According to Green all values are for, of, or in a person. Values are personal standards and all other so called values are but relative to persons. Values are thus wholly in a subject, and not in objects and are therefore personal or subjective; they are predicable of persons and not of things. But this is ignoring the fact that human life and mind live in an objective world which has a contributory importance for the realisation of their ideals and are not mere unconcerned and unrelated entities out of touch with the world of nature.

If individual persons can develop values independently of the objective environment, much more so can the universal reality realise itself only in and through the individual persons. But to make values purely personal, depending entirely upon its self-evolution and completely out of relation with

the environment, is to forget the important fact that self or person is not an isolated unit but forming a necessary part of the scheme of the universe. And Green not only denies objective validity in so far as value is embedded in the nature of things, but also he goes so far as to say: "To speak of any progress or improvement or development of a nation or society or mankind except as relative to some greater worth of persons, is to use words without meaning." Green applies the concept of value to persons not always finite but rather the collective or divine personality or the eternal self which realises its values in and through individual persons. Ultimately values are conserved in the eternal spirit and it is by the degree of attainment of perfection by individual persons or societies that we are enabled to say that a person or a society progresses. Thus value is wholly personal; though not necessarily individual, and that the objective world has nothing to do with the evolving of values in persons who are the ultimate references in the realm of values.

A question which the position of Green naturally suggests to our mind is whether according to Green value is a *quality* of the divine personality or its *essence*. Green, however, has not given us any definite answer to it; his reticence might be due to his general assumption that certain ultimate questions are "unanswerable." The question whether value is a quality or part and parcel of the divine personality is as unanswerable as "the question why there should be this reproduction (of the eternal consciousness through the human)," or "the question why the world as a whole should be what it is."[1] We would like to suggest that Green would have easily dispelled this ambiguity by simply thinking of God as the Universal Will fulfilling a purpose which is a future good.

Even Professor Pringle-Pattison, so remarkable for his

1. Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 93.

his thoroughness and perspicacity, has left it ambiguous in his encyclopedic work, *The Idea of God,* whether God is the Supreme Existence in whom all other existents find their being, or He is the sumtotal of all the values each of which is a quality of things and is therefore adjectival to them. So William Temple suggests, that consistently with the theistic view of the universe the ultimate principle must be Personal or Universal Will with a purpose, and the direct object of his creative activity is value.[1] But since value must embody itself in men and things, the universe has its origin and growth by way of realisation of the values which are thus the *raison de être* of the world as such. It follows that value is the essence of or co-substantive with the ultimate reality which is personal.

A modification of the above idealistic account of values in relation to personality, however has been proposed by some writers like Höffding and others. In this account we notice that values are eternal and that they are conserved in a being which is not necessarily a person. Höffding, for example, in his *Philosophy of Religion*, has tried to formulate this idea by his famous axiom that the higher values, Truth, Beauty and Goodness, are eternal realities having nothing to do with the flux of the temporal world and are not affected by the attainment or loss of, it by individual persons or societies; and that the essence of religion is a faith in the conservation of these higher values. This is really the Platonic idealism rehabilitated in the modern garb. But one thing is certain that this account of values as eternal verities embodied in a being and at the same time conserved in it, cannot in reality explain the progressive *increase* of values and the *changeful* religious and moral atmospheres which the development of religious and moral consciousness necessarily

1. *Cf. Contemporary British Philosophy*, First Series, pp. 427-8.

implies. In Höffding's view the ultimate spiritual being in which values are said to be conserved is denied personality, so that the relation between value and personality is explained away rather than explained. For it is just possible to think of the values as so many ideals receiving consummation in the universal being, just as individual persons are said to realise more and more ideals of life, but only in degree. In fact many thinkers like Dr. Sorley and others opine that the Divine Being is a supreme Personality and the very personality of the Divine Being consists in its continual creation and progressive consummation of the so-called values which are thus never a constant. The whole universe is rooted in values in the sense that every thing, every phenomenon, or event has a value-bearing which is not a subjective colouring on the part of the evaluator but proceeds from the very value-frame of the universe. Now this value-frame of the universe is nothing else than the divine constitution which tends the world towards the attainment or realisation of values by itself. Thus it appears that the ultimate Personality is not foreign to, but is realised or rather embodied in, the so-called values. In a slightly modified but more comprehensive way Dr. Rudolf Otto has, in his "*Idea of the Holy,*" striven to explain the relation between values and the divine personality. He thinks that to regard God as the most general and abstract values of Truth, Goodness and Beauty, is to give but a poor picture of the Supreme Personality; we should rather think of him as the "Numinous" or Holy, as the highest unity and Perfection of all values and therefore as transcending and at the same time co-ordinating them in his all-holy personality.

Among the realists the problem of value in relation to personality has received varied shades of interpretation ranging from the idealistic mould to its own typical matter-of-fact

characterisation. Alexander, for instance, does not make value to be purely subjective, our even purely objective; the typical values of Truth, Goodness and Beauty, do not wholly belong to the spiritual plane, but are partly determined by the objective character of things. The spatio-temporal order of the universe is tending towards evolution of values. Values orginate, he says, in the relation of one reality to another, in virtue of which a fresh reality is constituted. ' The simplest example of a reality which is compounded of mind and a non-mental thing is the *person* itself in which mind and body are compresent, and the person is neither subject-self alone, nor the object-self alone but the union of the two." Thus the very personal existence in which values necessarily arise brings out what Alexander thinks to be the relation between value and human personality. Values are the emergents among other emergents evolved as new qualities in the relation of interaction between the objective world and the subjective. And in his account of God in relation to value he maintains that God though a supreme person, is not the static embodiment of values as the Platonic conception makes him to be, or as has been re-echoed by Höffding, but is rather the resulting evolution of a progressive personality which harbours both values and un-values, truth and untruth, good and evil, beauty and ugliness as elements in his life. The entire universe is being led into higher and higher levels of existence by the restless movement of Time, which is termed, *'nisus'* towards a higher birth. This higher birth or the next higher empirical quality is ' deity." Deity is a variable quality and changes as the world grows in time. For each level of existence has its own deity as some unknown quality to be realised by the next higher level. In the mental level the deity is the next higher empirical quality to mind and appreciated as mental or spiritual. Thus deity is the type of emergence, and on the mental level

is founded on personal life but which cannot be adequately defined in terms of the categories of mind, spirit or personality. It follows then that values are but approximate material which helps the growth of deity; and God, as actual is not the eternal source of values, but values being emergents form the substructure for the life of God. Thus it is not God who evolves values, it is values that evolve God, under the influence or urge of the *'nisus'* of which we cannot predicate any thing of value or psychical.

It is just here that Lloyd Morgan joins issue with Alexander. Himself a realist and a propounder of Emergent Evolution Morgan agrees generally with Alexander in the details of the emergent scheme but parts company with Alexander when he points out that the very constitution of things is rooted in value. The entire process of the evolution is guided by Spiritual Activity which gives value-constitution to it. "Just as at the naturalistic base of things there is involved a space-time frame," says the Bristol Professor, "so, too, as I conceive, there is as foundational in spiritual Reality what I may perhaps call a value-frame;......just as we do not make space-time events, though they go to our making, so, too, as individual persons, we do not make values, but are made by them" (*Contemporary British Philosophy, First Series*, p. 305). This is certainly engrafting of Theism and Platonism on a naturalistic philosophy which seems to give way under idealistic metaphysics.

In Dr. Whitehead we discern that speculative acumen which is demanded of a philosopher who attempts at plausible reconciliation of the idealistic postulates with the strictly realistic analysis of the facts, phenomena and entities of nature. According to him the whole empirical system may be said to be the budding forth or "concretion of a certain necessary

substantial activity" which modalises or differentiates itself into three limited orders of existence. The general or *substantial* activity is thus the infinite possibility, resembling the infinite substance of Spinoza, and the three orders of limitation are its attributes. Of these three orders, the first is the logical order in which logical relations prevail; the second is the scientific order in which the relations of cause and effect predominate; and the third is the order of values which imposes further limitations or restrictions on the system of things. As Dr. Whitehead puts it, "Restriction is the price of value." For to evaluate a thing is to impose upon it further restrictions over and above what are imvolved in our logical and scientific estimate of it. Valuation presupposes standards of value whereby to accept or to reject, in addition to the logical and causal relations in which things necessarily stand before the evaluating activity. And Dr. Whitehead adds that reason fails to account for the reason why there should be these limitations. For reason obtains only within the realm of limitations and God who imposes these limitations must be beyond the pale of reason. In fact, he suggests that "God's existence is the ultimate irrationality." For no reason can be given for just that limitation which it stands in His nature to impose. God is not concrete, but is the ground of concrete actuality. (*cf. Science and the Modern World.*)

It appears then that the world of our experience is the home of the necessary distinctions and limitations which are expressed in terms of logical, scientific and value relations. The category of value therefore has its application within the system of events resulting from the self-limiting activity of God. God is himself therefore not the concrete personality, but an impersonal infinite, the sureme ground for limi-

tations, of which the system of events is composed. He is the author of the whole play, but why he makes his play to be such, is more than what we claim to know. "No reason can be given for the nature of God, for that nature is the very ground of rationality."

But in the more psychologistic approach to the problem of value in relation to personality made by the American Neo-realists of whom Prof. Perry may be taken to be the most reputed representative, we notice that the category of value has been made to descend from its axiological transcendence to become one of the homely psychical phenomena. It is no longer the transempirical ideals of truth, goodness and beauty that make up the very frame of the idealist's world, but rather the essence of value consists in the *interest* of the individual mind. Human interests are of course, infinitely varied and so must be values. And the personality which is only human, either individual or social, is nothing but organization of interests. Just as an individual personality consists, according to Perry, in the organisation of its interests into a system, even so a society is a person in so far as its individual members live in accord, and the total situation is greater than an individual person in the same way as an organism is greater than an individual cell. And such an organised society, in such a commonwealth of persons, in which there is "moral control of all persons by all-person, the values become commensurable." The social will will thus become an all-benevolent identical will. And 'the true best will be the preferred object of such an identical will when it is not only all-benevolent, but also enlightened." (Perry's *General Theory of Value*, pp. 685-686). And to extend personality beyond humanity to God is but the poor remnant of anthropomorphisms by which man has compromised God by

his desire to worship him, and argues bankruptcy of the human mind in thinking anew its more homely problems.

The student of Indian Philosophy is also well aware what an important place the concept of value in relation to that of personality occupies in the Indian systems of thought. Beginning from the ideas of *upādeya* or that which is to be accepted or attained as distinct from that of the *heya* or that which is to be eschewed we have the elaborate discussion on *Nihśreyasa* or the highest good, in the sense of liberation which engrosses all the Indian systems except the gross materialism of the Charvaka. The question of the attainment of *Nihśreyasa* or the value higher than which is inconceivable, is closely connected with the question of personality to be realised or demolished, as the case may be. In the Nyaya and the traditional Buddhist system salvation has a negative meaning in so far as both prescribe dissolution of personality, the former reducing consciousness to be a mere accident of the self which therefore in its liberated state is a mere unconscious entity, the latter preaching total blankness or vacuity (*Nairātmya*) of the psychical existence. Its shilly-shallying with metaphysics—its irresolution with regard to the nature of the absolute reality which defies all predication, fails to justify any conception of a personal self, far less the social self in the proper sense of the term.

In Sāṁkhya the question of *nihśreyasa* or *mokṣa* as the highest value has an interesting bearing upon personality. The Sāṁkhya assigns personality to the *Jivātman* or the self as determined by *Prakṛti* or the Material Principle. The *Mukta Puruṣa* is the self in its native purity of intelligence, devoid of conative and emotive excrescences, and is thus divorced from all value-content, all values and unvalues having reference to the *jivātman* or the materialised self. The

Jaina, however, tackles the problem of value and personality in humanistic spirit. He does not believe in any transcendental personal God creating and sustaining the universe. For his avowedly pluralistic metaphysics does not demand him to think like that. To him the highest personality belongs to *man* when he has attained *mōkṣa* or *jinahood* by the consummation of the intellectual emotive and moral values. Human personality to him is the highest value attainable by continued efforts in the right direction. The values (*Samyag jñānam Samyag darśanam* and *samyak-chāritram*) make up the very essence of the highest personality. They are not eternal, but are evolved on the mental plane by man in his interaction with the non-mental reality. Thus values apart from and independent of individual persons and personality as referred to an infinite existence are equal fictions of our mind.

In Hindu Idealistic Realism on the other hand we are familiar with the concept of *Puruṣōttama* or Supreme Personality who is the home of all that is highest and best (*Aśeṣakalyāṇaguṇa*) and human persons are elements in the life of that absolute person. In the pure Non-dualistic Idealism however, personality is a lower category having its application only within the range of relatives. The absolute and ultimate reallty is a pure existence not admitting of any qualifications and is equated with *Knowledge* or *Intelligence* as foundational to all that is and is known, and as such is not a person, but personality results from the self-imposed limitation of this unlimited Being-Knowledge. This limiting principle has been called *Māyā* in the non-dualistic Vedānta. It is otherwise termed as *Avidyā* or Cosmic Ignorance, because any human comprehension of the ultimate reality is beset with *underestimation* which falls short of its proper nature. For this is what is the proper significance of *Avidyā*, and not absence of all Vidya or knowledge. It follows then

that all our comprehension being human is *limited* in its scope, and so our value-judgments like all other judgments are illusory in the sense of being *inadequate* as applied to ultimate reality. Thus values and valuations refer at best only to the world of our practical estimation (*Vyavahārika*) and never to the ultimate reality which is beyond reason and estimation.

These considerations lead me to think that either in the Western or in the Eastern systems, the problem of value involves a reference to a system of specific limitations, including the different orders of relation in which things are to be apprehended, comprehended and appreciated by an equally limited agent born of the same limitations, which condition the whole empirical existence with all its contents—living, non-living and psychical. Personality, sharing in that system of necessary limisations, cannot be extended to the ultimate infinite reality, which is the ground of all limitations, but which is in itself beyond all limitations. To call that infinite possibility a person is to indulge in what is more than reason can scan. The concept of personality as applied to an organised body-mind reality, is well understood and its extension to the society as a wider personality which has a common weal is not without plausible grounds. But to think of God as the supreme personality including individual personalities as his elements is, in the first instance to commit the logical fallacy of composition, and secondly to drag down the unlimited absolute into the fold of the limited, which, in more technical theological term, is known as anthropomorphism. The ultimate reality is absolute fulness, infinite possibility, and as such defies all categories which enter into the empirical construct of our own world. Such a world is the world of limitations or *upādhis*. Herein the categories of value and personality among others have their full play. The values are but the standards of limitation whereby we appraise the

worth of things and events of the empirical world of *upādhis*, and the evaluating persons who are its members share in the limitations which pervade that world. And personality consists in the development and harmony of the values which the necessarily limited body-mind reality, with a view to appraise itself and its world, evolves out of its own empirical existence. As the harmony and consummation of values, personality is the highest category within the empirical world. But the ultimate met-empiric reality is thus beyond and above values and cannot be a person. The view-point I have adopted here I have called Critical Idealism which I have propounded elsewhere. For it is worth while to point out that, while doing justice to the findings of experience and reason which have their legitimate function in the empirical and pragmatic (*vyavahārika*) world, this viewpoint may be said to have established its working value by remaining contented to leave the *pāramārthika* or the ultimate reality as something beyond *vyavahārika* or pragmatic appraisement. It is at the same time not naturalism where we have to give anything spiritual—God and his personality—a decent burial; for we do not encourage any other principle in naturalism than pure physical energy in terms of electrons, protons, and their inherent motion. In our viewpoint the ultimate reality is only alogical or supra-rational existence which by its self-limitation modalises itself into the empirical world of limitations, where God is highest in being and knowledge but is after all a creation of the self-limiting activity of the unlimited reality, which is beyond logical, scientific and value-relations.

THE END.

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